# Canada Burden Sharing 1AC

### Deterrence Adv---1AC

#### Canadian BMD is crucial to deterring North Korea, Iran, and other rogue actors

Lam 17 [Danny Lam is an independent analyst in Calgary, “Pivoting to Missile Deterrence”, 10-6-2017, https://defence.frontline.online/blogs/3896-Dr.-Danny-Lam/8326-Pivoting-to-Missile-Deterrence] IanM

Nearly 13 years ago, Canada decided against joining the **U.S.** in **B**allistic **M**issile **D**efense (BMD). Since then, every major consideration that went into that decision has changed. Today, Canadian participation in BMD could pivot towards deterring regimes like North Korea. Ballistic Missile Deterrence, if you will.

The First Nuclear Age dynamic, where nuclear powers are deterred from using such weapons because of “Mutually Assured Destruction,” has worked since 1945 (and kept us safe under the American nuclear umbrella).

The **Second Nuclear Age**, an environment defined by “an unstable, dangerous, ‘multipolar nuclear order’” is upon us. **Threats have metastasized** in recent years, **and technical advances** have **turned an “iffy” proposition into a sophisticated**, **layered defence system** of acceptable odds.

Insurgent powers like North Korea, Iran, and many others are either already nuclear armed (or can become so quickly), and are rapidly perfecting the ability to deploy thermonuclear weapons on ICBMs that can reach anywhere in Canada. General [Joseph Dunford, Jr](https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography-View/Article/621329/general-joseph-f-dunford-jr/), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [testified before Congress](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/17-09-26-nomination_--dunford) in September that it can be assumed that North Korea (DPRK) can target anywhere in North America today. Clearly, as North Korea’s thermonuclear and missile arsenal expands, the threat grows.

In recent months, Kim Jong-un has explicitly threatened some of Canada’s closest allies – USA, [UK](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/north-korea-uk-threat-war-preparations-britain-theresa-may-pyongyang-a7912506.html), and [Australia](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/aug/21/north-korea-warns-australia-that-supporting-trump-is-a-suicide-act). Iran, Pakistan, and other powers are not far behind in developing ICBMs. It is not clear that U.S. extended (nuclear) deterrence will work as well in preventing an attack on Canada during the Second Nuclear Age as it did in the First.

U.S. Northern Command is responsible for the air, land, and sea approaches to the continental U.S., Alaska, Canada, and Mexico (and other regions such as Puerto Rico). It provides command and control of homeland defence, and is currently the sole decision-maker responsible for the BMD mission. The BMD system’s [Ground-based Midcourse Defense](https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/) (GMD) system is designed to intercept incoming threats in the midcourse phase of flight, and is currently the primary U.S. missile defense system devoted to defending the U.S. homeland from long-range ballistic missile attacks.

The commander of USNORTHCOM also commands [NORAD](http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/norad.page) (the North American Aerospace Defense Command is a bi-national command responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for Canada, Alaska and the continental United States).

**Canada is in direct line** between North Korea and targets in continental US. **If DPRK does decide to shoot at the US**, **what assurances are there that a missile wouldn’t fail in flight** and inadvertently (or on purpose) **land in Canada**? Alternatively, if Kim Jong-un wants to demonstrate a capability without threatening the US directly, a shot or airburst to Canada would be a great demonstration.

As it stands now, by not joining the BMD mission, **Canadians are not involved** in **decision-making** related to our own defence from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) – not even those directly targeted at Canada. And so, there is an **urgent need** to **both deter North Korea** from launching ICBMs as well as to **discourage others** **intent on acquiring nuclear ICBM capabilities.**

**Canadian officials**, [testifying](http://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/NDDN/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=9637426) before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence (September 14, 2017), gave **little weight** to the threat from DPRK to Canada. Stephen Burt, the Assistant Chief of Defence Intelligence at DND, downplayed the technical progress by North Korea, and speculated without any evidence that the “regime in North Korea is primarily motivated by its desire to survive and sustain its rule.” Mark Gwozdeckey, Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security at Global Affairs Canada, proclaimed that "There's been no direct threat to Canada". Gwozodeckey believes DPRK perceives Canada as “a peaceful and indeed a friendly country.”

Canadian officials either ignored or dismissed the explicit threats by DPRK to the U.S., Australia, UK, (all countries bound by mutual defence pacts to Canada) and indeed, all nations of the UN. Needless to say, longer-term **threats like Iran** are **not on** the Canadian **government’s horizon**.

Not surprisingly then, Canadian parliamentarians and government officials have no sense of urgency about the DPRK thermonuclear ICBM threat to Canada. The long timelines necessary to field a credible Canadian missile deterrence, fear over potential cost, and worry about whether or not missile defense “works” have stymied the discussion over the years. However, at long last, where NORAD modernization is concerned, the Liberal’s new Defence Policy clarifies that Canada will be looking at all threats to North America, across all domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber).

The big question on everyone’s mind is: does this include BMD? NORAD tracks every missile launch from North Korea and provides information to both Canadian and US governments already, but Canada cannot take part in the BMD decisions that US NORTHCOM alone is responsible for.

Prime Minister Trudeau may take the opportunity to discuss BMD [when he meets with President Trump](http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/justin-trudeau-washington-trip-meets-donald-trump-1.4318851) after Columbus Day / Canadian Thanksgiving.

The Trump Administration and Congress have reached a consensus on the urgency and scope of the DPRK threat to the United States, and by extension, allies including the UK, Japan, S. Korea, and Australia. Unambiguously, DPRK is regarded as an imminent existential threat to world order by most major U.S. allies, except Canada.

Canada can join this consensus with PM Trudeau educating his officials and building towards a similar political consensus in Canada in time to meet the threat. Or alternatively, by default, elect to abandon all extant Canadian alliances and rely solely on the US and UN for Canadian security.

Achieving a Canadian consensus on the DPRK threat to Canada is necessary, but not sufficient. There must be viable pathways that enable our nation to promptly and affordably field a credible defense. What are our options?

Getting Canada into the BMD room is proverbial the key to the kingdom and all political effort and education should be focused on that.

With all BMD under the command of U.S.-centric USNORTHCOM, the most expedient option for Canada to join BMD is to amend the NORAD mandate to include BMD. This opens the door to the sharing of technical data and information with Canada. The next step is to conduct a study of options for a Canadian missile deterrent architecture and how best to integrate it into the allied system. In exchange, the U.S. can place the [Ground-based Midcourse Defense](https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/) system under NORAD rather than USNORTHCOM, which currently commands it. That shift will allow Canadians to “stay in the room” and to “have a voice” when discussions of missile defence takes place.

The Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance estimates it will cost around $100 million to integrate BMD into NORAD with Canada fully in the loop with command and control on the system.

**North Korea is neither a stable addition** to the existing nuclear powers, **nor does it accept the prevailing nuclear power consensus** **that such weapons are** primarily **for defensive** **purposes** (i.e. to guarantee regime survival). On the contrary, DPRK explicitly announced to the UN general assembly in September that it intends to use its nuclear arsenal offensively for, among other things, extortion. Once this existential threat to Canada is recognized by the Canadian pubic, a defence plan can be developed.

Canada needs to be prepared to come to the missile defense (or deterrence) table with an attractive and fair deal.

Canada is in the process of acquiring 15 Canadian Surface Combatants (CSC). At present, missile deterrence is not part of those specifications. Reworking the requirements to ensure the highest possible level of ballistic missile deterrent capability possible (given the limitations of the bidders’ hull and power plant) can still be done inexpensively before the designs are finalized. Retrofits are both costly and time consuming.

New CSC specs incorporating state-of-the art sensors like Air and Missile Defense Radar with AEGIS, ensuring that there will be sufficient strike length Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) and that they support the current and next generation of anti-ballistic missiles, like the Standard SM3 Block 2A and successors, is essential before the bids are finalized and evaluated next month. If done now, the incremental cost per BMD-capable vessel will be modest, perhaps as little as US$100 million extra per ship.

Amending the Fighter Replacement specifications to include a requirement for integration into a missile deterrent sensor shooter web is another inexpensive method to increase Canadian capabilities for little incremental cost.

Canada might consider offering any or all of the following in exchange for GMD coverage:

Funding to further build out the system;

Host a GMD site in eastern Canada;

Host a BMD radar, and contribute toward its construction; and/or

Manning for joint crews, beyond the NORAD HQ.

The Prime Minister is responsible for to ensuring that Canadians are not the easiest target for a thermonuclear attack. BMD will not field a “leak proof” defence, but can certainly deter an attacker.

We can’t afford not to do it.

#### North Korean ICBM strikes are likely---development of long-range strikes, internal distress, and testing new leaders heightens escalatory risks

Scott A. Snyder 21, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. (“Top Conflicts to Watch in 2021: A North Korea Crisis”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/top-conflicts-watch-2021-north-korea-crisis

It is not clear that Kim’s self-restraint on long-range missile testing will continue. At the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) Eighth Party Congress staged only days prior to the Biden administration’s inauguration, Kim characterized the United States as its “foremost principal enemy,” and criticized U.S. perceived “hostile policy” toward North Korea despite North Korea’s “good-will efforts.” Military parades staged in conjunction with the Eighth Party Congress and on the October 10, 2020, 75th anniversary of the WPK revealed that North Korea has strengthened its conventional forces and has developed but not yet tested several new types of missiles capable of delivering a nuclear strike on the United States. While the Trump administration has left the door open to diplomatic negotiations since a one-day meeting with North Korean officials in Stockholm in October 2019, North Korea has refused to come to the negotiating table.

Meanwhile, Kim’s 2018 summitry gambit and accompanying economic hopes have turned to distress in the face of ongoing sanctions, North Korea’s COVID quarantine, and flooding from a series of typhoons, putting even greater pressure on Kim to achieve an economic breakthrough. North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress addressed these and other economic challenges while pledging to continue its military development and promising to respond to “force with toughness” and “good faith in kind.” This was as close as Kim came during the eight-day Party Congress to providing a signal of intent to open negotiations with the Biden administration.

In addition, many analysts expect North Korea to revert to its traditional playbook by returning to nuclear and missile tests as means by which to test new leaders as Kim has previously done with Obama, Xi Jinping, Park Geun-hye, and Trump. North Korea’s purpose in pursuing provocations would be to push North Korea closer to the top of the Biden administration’s agenda by generating a crisis atmosphere and shaping the space and prospects for diplomatic negotiations. Anticipation of North Korean provocations is so high that analysts have either rushed to recommend that Biden extend an early olive branch to North Korea in an effort to forestall a crisis or speculated about how to capitalize on a crisis to induce North Korea to return to denuclearization negotiations.

Regardless of whether Kim Jong-un is motivated by domestic economic distress or the desire to redress long-held international grievances, North Korea’s insistence on presenting itself as an entrenched nuclear weapons state remains at odds with the longstanding U.S. policy and international security norms upheld by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But North Korea’s capabilities are also an undeniable reality and an international security threat that must be managed to avoid catastrophic results. The Biden administration will need to devise a set of early actions to reassure North Korea of its willingness to engage in negotiations, reduce the risk of North Korean miscalculation, and forestall likely attention-grabbing provocations by North Korea, regardless of whether they emanate from manifestations of Kim’s military strength or his economic weakness.

#### US-North Korean nuclear war causes extinction

Alex Ward 18, a reporter covering the White House, with a focus on foreign policy and national security (“This is exactly how a nuclear war would kill you”, Vox, December 2018, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/19/17873822/nuclear-war-weapons-bombs-how-kill)

The theory around whether someone might drop a nuclear bomb takes away from the most serious matter in these discussions: the human and physical toll. Simply put, a nuclear strike of any magnitude would unleash suffering on a scale not seen since World War II. And with the advances in nuclear technology since then, it’s possible the devastation of the next nuclear strike would be far, far worse. It’s hard to picture what the effect of a modern-day nuclear attack would actually look like. But Wellerstein, the nuclear historian, created a website called Nukemap that allows users to “drop” a specific bomb — say, the roughly 140-kiloton explosive North Korea tested in September 2017 — on any target. So I did just that, detonating that North Korean device on the Capitol building in the heart of Washington, DC — and, well, see for yourself:

[figure omitted]

Roughly 220,000 people would die from this one attack alone, according to the Nukemap estimate, while another 450,000 would sustain injuries. By comparison, America’s two nuclear attacks on Japan in 1945 killed and injured a total of around 200,000 people (granted, Hiroshima and Nagasaki had smaller populations than the Washington metro area).

It’s very likely that North Korea wouldn’t launch just one bomb, but multiple at DC and likely some at New York City, the West Coast, and possibly US military bases in Guam and/or Hawaii.

But for simplicity’s sake, let’s focus on the effects of this one horrible attack.

The center yellow circle is the fireball radius — that is, the mushroom cloud — which would extend out about 0.25 square miles. Those within the green circle, approximately a 1.2-square-mile area, would face the heaviest dose of radiation. “Without medical treatment, there can be expected between 50% and 90% mortality from acute effects alone. Dying takes between several hours and several weeks,” according to the website.

Radiation poisoning is a horrible way to die. Here are just some of the symptoms people sick with radiation get:

* Nausea and vomiting
* Spontaneous bleeding
* Diarrhea, sometimes bloody
* Severely burnt skin that may peel off

The dark grey circle in the middle is where a shock wave does a lot of damage. In that 17-square-mile area, the bomb would flatten residential buildings, certainly killing people in or near them. Debris and fire would be everywhere.

People in the bigger yellow circle, a 33.5-square-mile area, would receive third-degree burns. “There’s a bright flash of light,” Brian Toon, a scientist and expert on nuclear disasters at the University of Colorado Boulder, told me about when the bomb goes off. Those exposed to the light, which would stretch for miles, would get those burns if their skin were exposed. The light would also “easily ignite fires with flammable objects like leaves, twigs, paper, or your clothing,” he added.

The victims may not feel much pain, however, because the burn will destroy pain nerves. Still, some will suffer major scarring or have the inability to use certain limbs, and others might require amputation, according to Wellerstein’s site.

The biggest circle encompasses the near entirety of the air-blast zone: a 134-square-mile area. People can still die, or at least receive severe injuries, in that location. The blast would break windows, and those standing near the glass might be killed by shards, or at least shed blood from myriad cuts.

Those who survive the bombing and its effects will have to walk through burning rubble and pass lifeless, charred bodies to reach safety. Some of them will ultimately survive, but others will succumb to sustained injuries or radiation. The wind, meanwhile, will carry the irradiated debris and objects — known as fallout because they drop from the sky — far outside the blast zone and sicken countless others.

As for Washington, it will likely take decades and billions of dollars not only to rebuild the city but clean it of radiation entirely.

It’s worth reiterating that all of the above are estimates for one strike on one location. An actual nuclear war would have much wider and more devastating consequences. And if that war spiraled out of control, the effects after the conflict would be much worse than the attacks themselves — and change the course of human history.

“Almost everybody on the planet would die”

It’s possible you have an idea of what a post-nuclear hellscape looks like. After all, disaster movies are obsessed with that kind of world. But scientists and other nuclear experts care deeply about this issue too — and their research shows the movies may be too optimistic.

Alan Robock, an environmental sciences professor at Rutgers University, has spent decades trying to understand what a nuclear war would do to the planet. The sum of his work, along with other colleagues’, is based on economic, scientific, and agricultural models.

Here’s what he found: The most devastating long-term effects of a nuclear war actually come down to the black smoke, along with the dust and particulates in the air, that attacks produce.

In a nuclear war, cities and industrial areas would be targeted, thereby producing tons of smoke as they burn. Some of that smoke would make it into the stratosphere — above the weather — where it would stay for years because there’s no rain to wash it out. That smoke would expand around the world as it heats up, blocking out sunlight over much of Earth.

As a result, the world would experience colder temperatures and less precipitation, depleting much of the globe’s agricultural output. That, potentially, would lead to widespread famine in a matter of years.

The impact on the world, however, depends on the amount of rising smoke. While scientists’ models and estimates vary, it’s believed that around 5 million to 50 millions tons of black smoke could lead to a so-called “nuclear autumn,” while 50 million to 150 millions tons of black smoke might plunge the world into a “nuclear winter.”

If the latter scenario came to pass, Robock told me, “almost everybody on the planet would die.”

#### Canadian BMD is key to effective North American BMD---solves missile threats, nuclear blackmailing, and EMP attacks

Dodge 14 [Dr. Michaela Dodge is Policy Analyst for Defense and Strategic Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation, “Why Canada Should Join the U.S. Missile Defense Program: Ballistic Missiles Threaten Both Countries”, 6-16-2014, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten] IanM

Canada and the United States have shared a special relationship for decades. Cooperation between these neighbors has resulted in one of the most successful international partnerships in history. A significant amount of this relationship has involved security cooperation, with Canada participating in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Despite the many remarkable accomplishments in collaborative national security measures between the U.S. and Canada, one area still falls short: Meaningful missile defense cooperation between these two nations has been rejected by the Canadian government on several occasions, most recently in 2005.[[1]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1)

Canada and the U.S. could greatly benefit from a missile defense partnership. Increasing threats of a ballistic missile attack from states such as North Korea and Iran necessitate more robust missile defense mechanisms in order to protect the North American continent. Collaborating on this issue would permit the two nations’ leaders to alleviate some of the burdens that missile defense programs entail and provide them with another means of protecting their citizens. Canada should recognize the threat, and benefits, and participate in U.S. long-range missile defense programs.

Troubled History

Canada and the United States are exceptional national security partners. These two nations share the longest undefended border in the world;[[2]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2) these two nations have engaged in over 2,500 defense agreements.[[3]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3) Canada has benefited from its proximity to the United States. In some regards, however, as former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau pointed out, Canadians “are eager to take refuge under the U.S. umbrella, but don’t want to help hold it.”[[4]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4) One example of such an arrangement is Canada’s reluctance to support missile defense systems that would be capable of protecting North America.

Canada’s support for missile defense cooperation with the U.S. has shifted over time. In 1958, Canada and the United States established NORAD—a military structure that provided greater cooperation on aerial defenses.[[5]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn5) In 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau refused the Nixon Administration’s offer to join the U.S. in an anti-ballistic missile program, then known as the Safeguard. The Canadians rejected American offers of cooperation when President Ronald Reagan extended an invitation to Canada to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative, the most comprehensive U.S. missile defense research and development effort to date.[[6]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn6)

Following the George W. Bush Administration’s announcement of withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 2001, the opportunity for significant Canadian and U.S. cooperation on missile defense arose again.[[7]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn7) Right after 2001, Canadian government officials began to reconsider cooperation. For example, in 2003, Defense Minister John McCallum stated that “NORAD represents the logical place in which to lodge ballistic missile defence.”[[8]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn8) Additionally, in 2004, Canada permitted its NORAD operators “to share information on incoming missiles.”[[9]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn9) On February 24, 2005, however, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre Pettigrew responded with a resolute “no” to Canadian participation in America’s missile defense program.[[10]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn10) Within the same year that Canada objected to working with the U.S. on the development of missile defense programs, the Canadian International Policy Statement recognized “that the threat posed by WMD, as well as the desires of ‘rogue’ states and terrorist groups to obtain them, was legitimate and needed to be addressed.”[[11]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn11) Following the 2005 policy statement, Prime Minister Stephen Harper revealed that the Canadian government does realize that “if North Korea would be ready to attack the United States, that would be a risk for Canada’s national security as well, not only because [of] our common values, but because [of] our geographical proximity.”[[12]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn12)

Recently, there seems to be some interest on the Canadians’ part in engaging the U.S. in talks about missile defense cooperation. Conservatives in the Canadian government have stated on “two separate occasions that [the Canadian government] is open to re-examining Canada’s position with respect to MD [missile defense].”[[13]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn13) In 2006, Canada announced that it would support “NATO’s decision to examine the feasibility of introducing a form of European missile defense that would work in conjunction with the US MD program.”[[14]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn14) Since Canada still adheres to its NATO commitment, it is bound by the Alliance’s 2010 declaration. According to NATO’s statement, missile defense is “a core element of our collective defense,” and the Alliance is committed to “develop[ing] the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack.”[15]

Keeping Up with the Long-Range Ballistic Missile Threat

A particularly concerning threat to North America involves the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by North Korea and Iran. These nations’ missile programs have been expedited by the sharing of missile technology among themselves as well as other sources.[[16]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn16) According to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2014 Annual Threat Assessment,

Ballistic missiles are becoming **more survivable, reliable**, and **accurate at greater ranges**. Potential adversaries are basing more missiles on mobile platforms at sea and on land. Technical and operational measures to defeat missile defenses also are increasing.… Iran, and North Korea, for example, exercise near simultaneous salvo firings from multiple locations to saturate missile defenses.[[17]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn17)

North Korea has aggressively pursued long-range missile capabilities for decades. Since North Korea’s 1971 agreement with China to “acquire, develop, and produce ballistic missiles,” the Hermit Kingdom has made significant steps toward mastering the production of ICBMs.[[18]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn18) The “military first” republic, which has threatened to use nuclear weapons on the United States, recently conducted its third nuclear device test and showcased an alleged road-mobile ICBM.[[19]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn19) Especially worrisome was North Korea’s launching of the “Taepodong-2 missile to put a satellite into orbit, thus demonstrating progress in its development of long-range missile technology.”[[20]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn20)

Prior to this progress the intelligence community has “consistently asserted that a functional Taepodong-2 could deliver a small payload to the western part of the continental United States.”[[21]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn21) The Dynamic Threat Assessment from the DIA gauged with “moderate confidence [that] the North currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles, however the reliability will be low.”[[22]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn22)

Iran began its own missile development program in the 1980s and continued it in the 1990s.[[23]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn23) Iran has claimed interest in developing long-range ballistic missiles, but experts have questioned the true purpose of its ballistic missile program, especially given its opacity regarding Tehran’s nuclear weapons program.[[24]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn24) Iran’s solid-propellant rocket and missile technologies continue to progress as evidenced by their Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and their “new solid-propellant MRBM with a claimed range of 2,000 kilometers.”[[25]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn25) In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “We continue to be very concerned about the Iranian missile threat, particularly as they continue to work on what we believe are weapons of mass destruction.”[[26]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn26)

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report produced by the Department of Defense in 2010 projected that the “threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to increase while growing more complex over the next decade” due in large part to Iran’s technological advances.[[27]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn27) Cooperation between Iran and North Korea speeds up the time frame for when these nations will have the ability to reach the United States with a ballistic missile.[[28]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn28) In fact, the Defense Department predicted in 2012 that Iran could possess ICBMs by 2015.[[29]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn29)

Currently, “only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not the focus of U.S. BMD [ballistic missile defense].”[[30]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn30) Vigilance and awareness of these nations’ long-range missile capabilities are vital to U.S. and Canadian national securities. Both Russia and China have aided Iran in its pursuit of a missile development program.[[31]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn31) Since President Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Russian military has undergone a massive modernization effort including a buildup of the Russian ICBM fleet.[[32]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn32) Russia has also significantly increased the amount of patrols of its strategic nuclear submarine fleet.[[33]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn33) China is also in the process of modernizing its ballistic missile arsenal. This modernization focuses on a shift from “relatively inaccurate liquid-fueled, silo/cave-based missiles, towards more accurate, solid-fueled road-mobile missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in order to strengthen its deterrent and increase its strategic options.”[[34]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn34)

There exists another scenario that poses an imminent threat to the United States and Canada known as the “scud in a bucket.” According to Dr. William R. Graham, chairman of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, “Such an attack could be launched from a freighter off the U.S. coast using a short- or medium-range missile to loft a nuclear warhead to high-altitude.”[[35]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn35) In the event of the detonation of a nuclear weapon high in the atmosphere above the United States, an EMP would occur; millions of Americans as well as Canadians would die. This attack would wreak havoc on the U.S. power grid by destroying America’s energy centers. Since “three of the eight North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability regions span both the United States and Canada,” the failure of one or all of these grids in the United States would have immediate ramifications for Canada.[[36]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn36) The technology involved in producing a scud is less sophisticated than for an ICBM; therefore, rogue states could equip terrorists with a scud missile tipped with a nuke and allow them do their dirty work.[[37]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn37) A long-range ballistic missile defense system, however, would not be effective against this type of attack.[[38]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn38)

Canada and the U.S. are inextricably connected. Their homelands not only share a border, but their economies are mutually dependent and now, more than ever, the level of national security of one of these nations has immediate ramifications for the other. If a long-range ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead detonated in the U.S. or in its atmosphere, the results would be devastating for both countries.

Benefits of Missile Defense Cooperation for Canada

Both the Canadian and U.S. governments have demonstrated their commitment to ensuring the national security of not just their homeland, but also that of their closest North American ally. These commitments have manifested themselves in some of the most successful defense agreements in U.S. history.

Instead of continuing a Cold War–era strategy of mutual vulnerability, the U.S. and Canada should promote policies that ensure their security and strengthen their posture vis-à-vis new unpredictable actors, such as Iran or North Korea, in an increasingly dangerous world. The U.S. should move toward a “protect and defend” strategy,[[39]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn39) a policy “based on shifting away from the retaliation-based strategic posture of the Cold War toward a more defensive posture that is adapted to the emerging international structure.”[[40]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn40) This posture encompasses offensive and defensive weapons, both nuclear and conventional. It also includes civil defense measures to ensure that the civilians increase their chances of survival in the case of a successful attack. States such as Iran and North Korea value the survival of their own leaders above those of their cities and economic centers, while the U.S. and Canada prioritize the opposite. Ballistic missile defense is an essential element of moving toward a more appropriate posture that would effectively address current national security challenges. Canadian participation in U.S. missile defense would benefit not only U.S. interests; it would also go a long way in serving Canadian interests.

The U.S. and Canada both endorse NATO’s missile defense programs for the protection of European allies. NATO adopted missile defense as a core competency of the Alliance in 2010 in its Strategic Concept.[[41]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn41)

Most important, participation in U.S. long-range ballistic missile defense would provide Canada with the means to defend its citizens and homeland from a potentially devastating ballistic missile attack. Rogue states know that Canada and the U.S. have a special relationship. These enemies may take the opportunity to exploit that friendship by attacking Canada. They could restrain U.S. freedom of action by holding its neighbor to the north hostage. Indeed, a successful ballistic missile attack would have serious repercussions for both countries as their economies are interconnected.

Cooperation between the two nations could take many forms. For example, Canada contributes to the U.S. Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which protects the U.S. from North Korean and Iranian ballistic missiles.[[42]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn42) General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command, told a Canadian and American audience: “I believe we’re at the point where we must take seriously the North Korean threat to our homelands. This is no longer a relatively primitive threat, but rather they are progressing towards troubling new capabilities.… As such, the threat validates the past and future U.S. investments in developing credible missile defenses against such potential threats.”[[43]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn43)

Canada could **contribute financial resources** or **territory** to U.S. missile defense efforts. Canadian **endorsement** of U.S. missile defense efforts would **show leadership** to other U.S. allies seeking to improve their ballistic missile defense capabilities. “Currently, Poland and Romania agreed to host Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. Turkey hosts an Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) forward-deployed radar. Spain is currently hosting U.S. Aegis missile-defense-capable ships. The Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark are considering upgrading their ships for a missile defense role. The Dutch navy is modifying ship radars to track ballistic missile targets. Spain, Norway, and the United Kingdom have also expressed interest in ship upgrades. Denmark and the United Kingdom host Upgraded Early Warning Radars.”[[44]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn44)

The military and intelligence worlds have warned of the threat of long-range ballistic missiles to the Canadian and U.S. homelands.[[45]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn45) And politicians of both countries should endorse cooperation on a missile defense system. As former Canadian Defense Minister John McCallum stated, “It is the fundamental responsibility of the Canadian government to ensure the maximum protection of the lives of its citizens.”[[46]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn46) Missile defense would provide Canada with an effective system to protect its citizens from one of most effective threats to the modern way of life—ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

Canada already endorses missile defense for NATO allies in Europe, so Canadian participation in U.S. missile defense would be a natural extension of the current policy. Canadian positive endorsement of U.S. missile defense efforts would send a message to adversaries that Canada considers protecting its citizens from a ballistic missile threat a priority. NATO members have begun contributing to the U.S. missile defense system. Currently, “21 nations are directly participating in this networked system of systems. Yet Canada is not one of them.”[[47]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn47) The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Germany, and Romania have all made contributions.[[48]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn48) Canada has signed off on NATO missile defense programs; and, therefore, “Canada now officially endorses the logic, strategic utility and security benefits of ballistic missile defense.”[[49]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn49)

Cooperation on missile defense is a mutually beneficial arrangement. Both European and Asian nations have received U.S. protection in exchange for hosting U.S. missile systems.[[50]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn50) In return for its endorsement of U.S. missile defense, Canada might seek a voice in U.S. missile defense decisions regarding incoming missiles headed for Canada. For example, the Canadian government could ensure that Canadian cities are at the top of “the priority list for missile interceptions.”[[51]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn51) Currently, Canada would not have a voice regarding what happens to an incoming missile headed for Canada.

Currently, Canada can “can issue warnings of an impending attack on the continent but cannot participate in decisions regarding interception,” even when a missile is heading straight toward Canada.[[52]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn52) This leaves the hundred or so Canadian personnel at the Colorado Springs missile defense site with the option of doing nothing in the event of a missile attack on the United States or Canada.[[53]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn53)

The undeniable interconnectedness of U.S. and Canadian national securities necessitates cooperation. Over decades, such cooperation has resulted in “a wide range of bilateral arrangements,” which encompasses “joint planning and operations, combined exercises, defence production, logistics, communications, research and development, and intelligence sharing.”[[54]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn54)

There is also an issue of delegation of authority regarding intercepts of incoming missiles. Proper command and control procedures must be in place before a ballistic missile is launched, as there will be precious little time to discuss such vital issues when a missile is en route toward its victims. A long-range ballistic missile takes about 33 minutes to reach its target, which means that commanders have literally minutes to decide what to do about an incoming missile. Any delays can lower the chance of interception—or deny the U.S. an opportunity to fire a second interceptor should the first one miss.

Missile defense cooperation could allow governments to pool resources and share financial burdens. Even relatively small contributions can make a substantive difference for all NATO members. Similarly, U.S. and Canadian missile defense cooperation could help relieve some of the associated costs of the program for both parties. Since the U.S. already has a significant missile defense system in place, Canada would not be burdened with research and development costs, which present a significant investment upfront.

Retired Canadian Lieutenant-General and former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NORAD George Macdonald pointed out the moral and substantive “free rider” critiques against the Canadian government: “Morally, Canada has purportedly given up its sovereign responsibility to defend itself against ballistic missiles, while substantively, it is argued that Canada will now be dependent upon the US to provide that defence at US discretion and on US terms.” [[55]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn55)

**Adversaries may take advantage** of Canada’s **current vulnerability** to a ballistic missile attack. At the moment, Iran and North Korea can most likely reach the U.S. and Canada with a ballistic missile. Additionally, Iran can reach Canadian forward-deployed troops. These nations continue to tenaciously pursue ballistic missile technology. Regardless of the financial or international consequences, they have shown that they will continue their pursuit of these weapons. Currently, ballistic missile defense “is among the only defensive options available to reinforce the West’s commitment, resolve, and capability to protect key allies against nuclear blackmail.”[[56]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/why-canada-should-join-the-us-missile-defense-program-ballistic-missiles-threaten%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn56) Missile defense not only protects a nation and its allies from a direct attack, but also from the manipulation of rogue nations.

#### Nuclear coercion destroys US alliance credibility and escalates globally

Roberts & Perry ’14 [Brad; June 2014; consulting Professor at Stanford University and William Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation; Proliferation Papers, “On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense,” no. 50]

The foundation would be a strategy of nuclear brinksmanship, not nuclear war-fighting. Nuclear war-fighting would likely be seen as quickly legitimizing a U.S. decision to employ its full strengths at the conventional and nuclear levels to achieve the most decisive possible outcomes as quickly as possible. This is not in North Korea’s interest. But blackmail might seem plausible. To be successful, nuclear blackmail requires both the credible demonstration of resolve and the credible demonstration of restraint. The resolve relates to the willingness to make good on an escalatory threat and the restraint relates to the willingness not to inflict punishment if terms are met. North Korea’s strategy would require that its leaders believe that they can escalate an unfolding conflict in various ways but without crossing the nuclear response threshold of the United States. They may believe that there are vulnerabilities in U.S. power projection that can be exploited and illuminated, both of an operational kind (the dependence on a few key ports and bases in the region) and of a political kind (the willingness of U.S. allies to stand with it in an escalating crisis). And if they see the threat of nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland as credible, they may also believe that they can employ nuclear weapons in the theater in support of these operational and political objectives and restrain U.S. retaliation by threatening the U.S. homeland. In the language of escalation control, North Korean leaders may come to believe that their new tools of coercion enable them to manage escalation if it becomes necessary, both horizontally (by attacking more targets in the region and/or beyond) and vertically (by increasing the lethality of those attacks).9 Further, North Korea’s leaders seem to believe with Sun Tzu that it is preferable to subdue an enemy than to defeat it. More precisely, they may believe that the United States, RoK, and Japan can all assess the impact of a nuclear-armed North Korea on the calculus of regional deterrence and decide accordingly to alter their strategic calculus in various ways. U.S. allies may come to believe that the United States has become de-coupled from their defense (to invoke a cold war term) by virtue of the new vulnerability of the American homeland to North Korean attack. The United States itself may conclude that the likely costs and risks of seeking regime removal in war outweigh the potential benefits. Thus, North Korean leaders might hope that the United States will abandon its hostile policies and agree to a political settlement on the peninsula consistent with Pyongyang’s preferences. The conditional verb tense highlights the speculative nature of this line of reasoning. Little is known about how North Korea thinks about or plans for armed confrontation with the United States under the nuclear shadow. The typical American instinct is to believe that North Korea’s leaders too will believe that nuclear war cannot be fought because it cannot be won. There is no evidence one way or the other with regard to North Korea’s instincts. But the capabilities they have deployed and are developing and deploying enable a bold but risky strategy of nuclear blackmail. From a U.S. perspective, these developments are highly consequential. Successful North Korean blackmail in peacetime or war would set precedents of a far-reaching kind, calling into question the credibility of U.S. security guarantees more generally while also validating the implicit Sundarji premise that nuclear weapons are useful for coercing the United States into accepting an outcome to a regional conflict that it would not accept in the absence of adversary nuclear threats. The wrong choices by the United States and its allies in a military crisis with North Korea under the nuclear shadow could tip the security environment in a dangerous new direction. To be coerced into appeasing a nuclear-backed challenger or to accept defeat in a regional war with some nuclear aspect could have wide-ranging repercussions for the international situation after such a war. The wrong choices could also lead to the “nuclear cascade” long feared by policymakers.10 For instance, a failure of U.S. deterrence could embolden others to seek capabilities of their own with which to challenge the United States and U.S.-guaranteed regional orders. A failure of assurance of key allies could similarly lead them to conclude that they can no longer count on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to protect them. As a model of the new strategic problem, North Korea helps to illuminate a broad spectrum of deterrence challenges in regional conflict under the nuclear shadow. Those challenges come in three distinct sets. 1. At the low end of the conflict spectrum are provocations and confrontations just below the level of armed conflict. These encompass for example North Korea sinking of the Cheonan or the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island or China’s confrontational posturing in support of its claims in the maritime environment. These are what the latest Japanese defense white paper defines as “gray zone” conflicts.11 2. At the opposite, high end of the spectrum are nuclear attacks on the homeland of the United States. Think of this as the “black-and-white zone,” where any attack by nuclear means on the homeland of the United States or an ally should be understood as generating a U.S. nuclear response. 3. In the middle are what might be termed “red zone” threats – conflicts involving actual combat operations and efforts by newly capable regional actors to try to exploit new nuclear and missile capabilities to their advantage with actions that they calculate or hope to be beneath the U.S. nuclear response threshold. Each of these areas poses new deterrence challenges in the 21st century. Assertiveness in the “gray zone” by North Korea has markedly increased, perhaps as a result of North Korea’s success in developing strategic forces that it believes can negate the risks of escalatory responses by the United States and RoK.12 Deterrence in the “black and white zone” is not a new challenge but it is new in form, as a dangerous and unpredictable North Korea acquires the means to conduct such strikes. The “red zone” is an area that heretofore has attracted little analytic attention.13 But there are new challenges that seem to be little understood. Among those is the significant potential for miscalculation by the aggressor. In this red zone, it is possible to identify some of the key decisions by the adversary related to these new nuclear and missile capabilities for which U.S. deterrence strategies and capabilities must be credible and effective. Again, it is useful to use North Korea as a model. In a war on the peninsula, the leadership in Pyongyang would likely face a number of specific decisions about how to utilize nuclear-tipped missiles and other means to try to persuade Seoul and Washington to accept a political settlement on terms favorable to its interests but without generating a response by the allies involving the employment of the overwhelming nuclear forces available to them. These are decisions: 1. To move from a strategy of military provocations into military action aimed at accomplishing a fait accompli on the ground quickly, and reversible at high cost to the United States and its allies (and perhaps involving the use of chemical and/or biological weapons against key allied bases on the peninsula to slow U.S. intervention and local operations and also to signal escalation risks for the RoK and explicit threats to employ nuclear weapons if the allies do not accept the fait accompli). 2. If this strategy fails to produce the desired political results, to escalate by conducting missile attacks with non-nuclear weapons on U.S. bases and other targets in Japan. 3. If this fails, to conduct a limited nuclear attack. North Korea might believe that such an attack could break the alliance (by inducing the RoK to sue for peace before the United States is prepared to do so) without running a significant risk of U.S. retaliation. It might believe that an off-shore demonstration shot or a high-altitude burst for its electro-magnetic pulse effects would not be seen by Washington as warranting a retaliatory strike that would potentially kill many. Presumably this type of action would also be accompanied by a threat of more North Korean nuclear attacks if the allies do not sue for peace on the North’s terms. 4. If this fails, to threaten or conduct limited nuclear attacks on Japan or U.S. bases there, with the threat of more to come. 5. If this fails, to threaten or conduct limited nuclear attacks on U.S. military facilities in the American homeland engaged in military operations against North Korea (for example, Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu or the missile defense facilities in Alaska). 6. And if the United States employs nuclear weapons in retaliation, to respond or not with additional nuclear attacks of its own, whether on U.S. bases and forces in the region or on the American homeland more generally. The regional deterrence architectures of the United States and its allies in East Asia must be effective in shaping each of these six choices. Each decision in this hierarchy would involve assessments of the resolve of the United States and its allies to continue in an escalating conflict, as well perhaps as assessments of Pyongyang’s own resolve. Each new action by Pyongyang can be understood as a test of the separate or collective resolve of Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. In the scenario above, Kim Jong Un would be making choices to signal his resolve to safeguard his interests even in an escalating conflict, while testing the resolve of the alliance arrayed against him to remain intact. The United States would seek to signal its resolve to safeguard its ally and forces and the American homeland, while testing the resolve of the aggressor regime to remain committed to aggression and escalation. This is a competitive and inherently risky strategy.15 Any such competitive testing of resolve would bring to the fore in the decision-making process the stake each “side” perceives in the conflict – and the perceived stake of the adversary. Presumably each side begins with the premise that its stake is more substantial. For North Korea, a vital interest would seem to be at stake – regime survival. For the United States, the vital interest of an ally or allies would be at stake – their long-term viability under a political outcome dictated by the North if the United States were to concede. North Korean leaders may believe that their vital interest is the more compelling, thus lending credibility to their escalatory threats in their eyes. Accordingly, a key danger is the potential for miscalculation of resolve. 16 To escalate by any means seems to require a conviction that the other side lacks the resolve to retaliate or to counter-escalate. Leaders in North Korea may calculate that the resolve of the United States and its allies is weak, perhaps because of a belief that democracies are paper tigers or so casualty averse as to avoid escalation at all costs. The United States and its allies may calculate that the resolve in Pyongyang is weak, perhaps because of a belief that nuclear war is unwinnable and thus will not actually be fought. In tests of resolve, bluffs are often employed. This creates the additional risk of miscalculation derived from a decision to dismiss as a bluff a statement of resolve that is no bluff at all. It is possible also that a regional aggressor might choose to conduct nuclear attacks even in a lost war for the sole purpose of exacting vengeance on the victorious side (a purpose for which Saddam Hussein’s biological weapons may have been intended). This analytical model derives from the situation on the Korean peninsula but has broader applicability. In today’s security environment, the deterrence challenge facing the United States and its allies is not associated with a global conflict; rather, it arises from the potential for regional conflicts under the nuclear shadow (that is, the presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the combatants and the potential for their use in extreme circumstances). North Korea is the latest and most vivid example of this emerging problem. Iraq and Libya came as models of this problem soon after the Cold War, though neither ended up posing this particular deterrence problem. Iran may yet fit this model, if it chooses not to freeze its nuclear program. The continued prevalence of nuclear and missile proliferation in the international system implies that there could well be other such challenges in the future. Responding to an Adversary’s Theory of Victory This new strategic problem has been taking shape ever since the wakeup call provided by the Persian Gulf War. With an eye on this emerging problem, the United States has made some clear and decisive strategic choices. To a significant extent, these are common across administrations since the end of the Cold War and enjoy a significant degree of bipartisan support. In its national strategy, the United States has chosen to remain engaged, not retreat into isolationism, and to modernize its alliances for 21st century purposes. In its military strategy, it has chosen to project power in support of its international commitments and to maintain strong capabilities for deterring and defeating potential regional aggressors. The United States has also rejected mutual vulnerability as the basis of the strategic relationships with states like North Korea. It has done so in part because of an abiding concern that a multipolar world based on the principle of mutual assured destruction would be deeply unstable. In a world of multiple nuclear powers large and small with nuclear arsenals of intercontinental reach, the vision of world order set out in the United Nations system – of cooperative and collective security – might be seen as finally failed, as a handful of major powers are no longer able to exercise power to secure international peace. But there are other reasons as well. U.S. nuclear threats may not be credible, especially for gray zone conflicts and for red zone conflicts if the adversary believes there are significant military actions he can take that fall beneath the U.S. nuclear response threshold. U.S. nuclear threats may also not be effective, especially for reducing the coercive value of aggressor nuclear threats and against leaders who calculate that an asymmetry of stake lends credibility to their threats that the U.S. lacks because its interests at risk are not vital. Heavy reliance on nuclear threats is also not reassuring to allies, who seek protection and assurance in addition to deterrence. Heavy reliance on nuclear threats would also be unhelpful to the effort to strengthen international cooperation for nonproliferation and disarmament.

#### EMP attacks destroy critical infrastructure and American grids

Thomas S. Popik et al. 17, Chairman of the Foundation for Resilient Societies; Jordan T. Kearns, Professor in the Geology department at James Madison University; George H. Baker III, Senior Advisor to the Congressional EMP Commission; Henry F. Cooper, chairman of Applied Research Associates and senior associate of the National Institute for Public Policy; William R. Harris, “High Consequence Scenarios for North Korean Atmospheric Nuclear Tests with Policy Recommendations for the U.S. Government,” Department of Integrated Science and Technology – Faculty Scholarship, 11/30/2017, https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=isat.

The E1 pulse will impact land-based electrical infrastructure connected to conductors of approximately 0.3 meters length or more, such as antennas, coaxial cables, twisted pair conductors, power cords, Ethernet patch cords, etc. Particularly affected will be any connected equipment with integrated circuits, such as computers, internet routers, and industrial control systems. Self-contained devices with no connected cords, such as handheld cell phones, are less likely to be impacted.

The E3 pulse will impact land-based electrical infrastructure connected to long conductors running several kilometers or more. Induced currents of up to 1,000 amperes can cause overload and premature failure. Examples of vulnerable equipment include power transformers at the ends of high voltage transmission lines, line driver cards at the ends of long metallic communication landlines, and repeaters necessary for the operation of long fiber optic lines.

Undersea Cables

The E3 pulse penetrates deep into ocean waters and has the potential to impact undersea telecommunications cables. 45 While modern undersea cables transmit their signals using nonconductive fiber optics, repeaters are required approximately every 100 kilometers to boost the optical signal. Currents induced in the repeater power leads from the E3 pulse can be in the thousands of amps46; if the circuitry is not protected, overload and immediate burnout can occur.

The E1 pulses will not affect submarine cables, but may damage electronic components within aboveground unprotected cable landing sites.47

Aircraft

During high-altitude nuclear tests Kingfish (95 kilometers altitude), Bluegill (48 kilometers altitude), and Checkmate (147 kilometers altitude), instrumentation aircraft experienced electronic upsets, proving that the E1 pulse from EMP can impact airplanes. (All aircraft were able to land safely). The aluminum enclosures of aircraft provide limited shielding as partial Faraday cages. Today’s avionics are commonly shielded against electromagnetic interference from lightning, radios, radars, passenger cell phones, etc. Nonetheless, because of widespread adoption of digital “fly by wire” controls, modern aircraft are vastly more dependent on electronic circuits than military aircraft used during the 1960’s Operation Fishbowl tests. 48 Without placing commercial airframes in EMP test trestles, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that EMP can “cause airplanes to fall from the sky.”

Satellites

Due to x-rays released by low-yield nuclear detonations above the stratosphere, unhardened commercial satellites within 1,000 kilometers of the burst will suffer immediate damage to their semiconductor-based circuits. For a burst at 120 kilometers, about 10% of LEO satellites will fail from direct radiation exposure. In addition, long-term damage to satellites will result from the injection of ionizing radiation into the Van Allen belts. The Van Allen belts trap free electrons that can persist in orbit for years, colliding with satellites. This lingering “trapped electron” effect dramatically reduces the operational life of satellites, sometimes to just weeks. The free electron issue is most acute for satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO)—160 kilometers altitude to 2,000 kilometers. After the 1962 Starfish Prime EMP test, one-third of all satellites in LEO failed due to cumulative radiation effects. 49

While many military satellites are now hardened against nuclear radiation, commercial satellites generally are not. Applications for commercial and military satellites in LEO include earth observation and spy satellites, satellite phones (Iridium and GlobalStar), and broadband digital communications (Teledesic). A high-altitude EMP test will cause extensive damage to LEO satellites.

Humans

Direct and immediate impacts of EMP on humans are likely to be minimal. For people directly gazing skyward at the fireball, temporary blindness or even permanent retinal damage may occur, depending on distance, detonation altitude, and meteorological conditions. 50 EMP would cause no blast and shock effects at ground level. Likewise, immediate radiation at ground level would be minimal. However, nuclear debris from EMP detonations above the troposphere would descend over a period of months to years and be carried around the earth by winds in the stratosphere.

Duties to Notify Airmen and Mariners

Under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, which entered into force on April 4, 1947 and to which North Korea is a party, nations that anticipate a hazard to civil aviation have an obligation to provide Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) of an impending test or closure area. Pursuant to the law of the sea, coastal states are obligated to provide comparable Notices to Mariners (NOTMARs). Failure to provide timely and reliable notice in advance of missile or nuclear weapons tests increases risks to public safety and public health, including risks of retinal burns and potential blindness, and radioactive debris contamination. North Korea has not reliably issued NOTAMs or NOTMARs for past tests. To conduct an atmospheric nuclear test without appropriate advance warnings would be wrongful under international law, and a needless harm. North Korea, acting as a pariah state, has not reliably provided advance notices to the International Civil Aviation Organization or to aircraft operators in its vicinity.51 These failures to provide warning of test hazards suggest that in the design of test monitoring capabilities, the United States and its allies should not depend upon mandatory notices as “tip offs” to prepare for test monitoring.

Atmospheric Test Scenarios

Taking into account demonstrated North Korean missile capabilities and past trajectories, statements and threats by North Korea, and potential impacts on critical infrastructure and human population, we constructed five potential North Korean atmospheric test scenarios.

Each test scenario has three basic characteristics:

1. Path and terminus of trajectory: following previously observed missile trajectories or not, over ocean only, over landmasses and populations other than North Korea’s, etc.

2. Purpose of the scenario: demonstration of integration of missile and warhead, reentry capability, E1 effects, E3 effects, impacts on critical infrastructures, etc.

3. Altitude of detonation.

Importantly, we believe that all five postulated test scenarios are within current North Korean technical capabilities. These scenarios consider live tests of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Because of risks associated with fuzing malfunction, launch failure, and guidance errors, nations have rarely tested nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles. However, if North Korea were to conduct an atmospheric test in the Pacific, we believe delivery via an armed missile is most probable given the risks of localized fallout from a surface burst in nearby waters and also the risk of interception of any naval vessel or aircraft used as a delivery mechanism.

We present the atmospheric test scenarios in rough order of risk and level of provocation. For example, a “North Pacific” test over the ocean at 20 kilometer altitude will not produce appreciable EMP effects or harm satellites, but will demonstrate miniaturization and capability for high-altitude fuzing of a missile and warhead system. In contrast, a 150 kilometer altitude test slightly north of Guam could demonstrate both E1 and E3 impacts on critical infrastructure, including debilitation of undersea telecommunications cables and large numbers of satellites.

Our five test scenarios are illustrative, but not exhaustive. We believe our scenarios are more likely than others because they minimize the risk of international sanctions by limiting collateral damage or, alternatively, demonstrating E1 and E3 effects on less infrastructure. Nonetheless, because of the very few pathways for missile trajectories that avoid overflight of human populations, the extensive network of undersea telecom cables in the Pacific,52 a EMP effects on LEO satellites regardless of test location, and the potential for globally distributed fallout, there are no safe scenarios for atmospheric EMP tests by North Korea.

#### Interruptions in grid reliability cause cascading nuclear meltdowns—extinction

Huff 14 (Ethan A. Huff, staff writer. “Nuclear power + grid down event = global extinction for humanity” August 12th 2014, [http://www.naturalnews.com/046429\_nuclear\_power\_electric\_grid\_global\_extinction.html)](http://www.naturalnews.com/046429_nuclear_power_electric_grid_global_extinction.html%29)

If you think the Fukushima situation is bad, consider the fact that the United States is vulnerable to the exact same meltdown situation, except at 124 separate nuclear reactors throughout the country. **If anything should happen** to our nation's poorly protected electric power grid, these reactors have a high likelihood of failure**, say experts,** a **catastrophic scenario** that would most likely lead to the **destruction of all life on our planet, including humans.** Though they obviously generate power themselves, nuclear power plants also rely on an extensive system of power backups that ensure the constant flow of cooling water to reactor cores. In the event of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), for instance, diesel-powered backup generators are designed to immediately engage, ensuring that fuel rods and reactor cores don't overheat and melt, causing unmitigated destruction. But most of these generators were only designed to operate for a maximum period of about 24 hours or less, meaning they are exceptionally temporary in nature. In a real emergency situation, such as one that might be caused by a systematic attack on the power grid, it could take days or even weeks to bring control systems back online. At this point, all those backup generators would have already run out of fuel, leaving nuclear reactors everywhere prone to meltdowns. Cost to retrofit power grid minimal, but government won't do it According to Dave Hodges from The Common Sense Show, it would only cost taxpayers about $2 billion to update the power grid and protect it from attack or shutdown. This is roughly the same price as a single B-1 Stealth Bomber, or the annual sum that the government pays American farmers not to grow crops. In other words, it is a mere drop in the bucket compared to everything else the government spends money on. And yet nothing is being done to protect the power grid against failure or, worse yet, an attack by domestic or foreign enemies. Investment guru Paul Singer warned about this, noting that an electromagnetic surge is the "most significant danger" facing the world today. "Even horrendous nuclear war, except in its most extreme form, can [be] a relatively localized issue," said Singer, "and the threat from asteroids can (possibly) be mitigated." Spent fuel racks contain radiation that won't be contained during an emergency In the event of a disaster or loss of power, a nuclear plant's emergency power systems are designed to automatically engage, while its control rods are dropped into the core. Water is then pumped into the reactor to mitigate excess heat, in turn preventing a meltdown. And just to be sure, spent fuel rods are encased in both a primary and secondary containment structure, aiding in meltdown prevention. But if the emergency results in longer-term power losses, and backup generators run out of power, this constant flow of cooling water will eventually run dry. This is what happened at Fukushima, resulting in several reactor cores melting right through their containment structures into the ground. There is also the issue of residual spent fuel, which is normally contained in high-density storage racks that are not taken into account during an emergency. "...contained in buildings that vent directly into the atmosphere, radiation containment is not accounted for with regard to the spent fuel racks," explained Hodges. "In other words, there is no capture mechanism." Like many others, Hodges wants to know why the government refuses to take this important situation more seriously. Again, it wouldn't cost that much in the greater scheme of things to bring the power grid up to proper safety standards, protecting Americans and their infrastructure from a possible cascade of nuclear meltdowns. So why isn't it happening?

#### Canadian BMD is goldilocks---it solves Asian proliferation and deterrence BUT won’t scare Russia or China

Harvey 14 [Frank Harvey was appointed Eric Dennis Memorial Chair of Government and Politics in 2013 (Dalhousie University), and held the position of University Research Professor of International Relations from 2008-2013. He served as Associate Dean of Research in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (2011-2013), held the 2007 J. William Fulbright Visiting Research Chair in Canadian Studies, served as Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, and is currently a Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence”, March 2014, https://www.cgai.ca/canada\_ballistic\_missile\_defence#About%20the%20Authors] IanM

My objective today is to highlight what I regard as a significant and puzzling inconsistency in Canada’s policy on ballistic missile defence. A more detailed paper outlining the potential dangers associated with this inconsistency can be found on the CDFAI website.1

In November 2010, 28 NATO members met in Lisbon to sign NATO’s updated Strategic Concept, a document outlining alliance members’ obligations and commitments to enhance “collective” security.

The 2010 document includes a crystal clear commitment by all NATO members to: “Develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance.” As President Obama stated in his closing remarks, “we’ve agreed to develop missile defense capability that is strong enough to cover all NATO European territory and populations, as well as the United States.”

At NATO’s 2012 Summit in Chicago, alliance members reinforced their collective commitment to BMD:2

“We continue to be concerned by the increasing threats to our Alliance posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles…. The aim of this capability (as stipulated in Lisbon) is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens…taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.”

NATO’s 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review added additional weight to the alliance’s (and Canada’s) missile defence commitments:3

“The proliferation of ballistic missiles is a growing concern for the Alliance and constitutes an increasing threat to Alliance security. NATO’s ballistic missile defence capacity will be an important addition to the Alliance’s capabilities for deterrence and defence.”

As a NATO member, there is no question any longer that Canada officially endorses the logic, strategic utility, and security imperatives underpinning BMD. In essence, the Government of Canada (GoC) now fully embraces the merits of multinational cooperation on missile defence as part of Canada’s treaty obligations and alliance commitments.

The debate in Ottawa over the merits of BMD is essentially over, except when it comes to the government’s obligation to protect Canadian territory and populations from the very same threats. Why?

The most perplexing aspect of Canada’s official endorsement of BMD is the ongoing reluctance (or refusal) by the GoC to engage in bilateral talks with our most important ally on BMD architecture and interceptor algorithms to protect Canadians.

Keep in mind, Canada’s signatures on each one of these documents confirm Ottawa’s support for BMD, but these signatures also clearly imply that the GoC has rejected the various opinions put forward by BMD critics. And there are very sound reasons why these considerably out-dated opinions have been dismissed.

For instance, **critics** were absolutely **convinced** that US BMD would compel Russia to launch a new arms race (committee members can easily find examples of these dire warnings from previous House and Senate hearings on BMD). Consider Steven Staples’ conclusions:4

“From our standpoint in Canada, neither the high cost of missile defense nor its functionality was our chief concern. Our arguments against missile defense focused mainly on the risk of provoking another nuclear arms race and the weaponization of space, in addition to the broader abandonment of Canada's traditional support for arms control and peacekeeping.” (2006: 140)

In direct contrast to Staples’ mistaken predictions, we have witnessed some of the most sweeping bilateral disarmament agreements in history. The most recent US-Russia agreement lowered the number of deployed strategic warheads from 2,200 to 1,550 -- 74% lower than the 1991 START Treaty and 30% lower than the 2002 Moscow Treaty.5 These are significant steps in the right direction, and critics could not have been more mistaken.

How do we explain the fundamental errors underpinning the critics’ erroneous projections (and fear mongering) about another arms race and the **inevitable deterioration** of **US-Russia relations**? Essentially, **BMD critics** misunderstood (and continue to ignore) the fundamental transformations in international politics that took shape after the Cold War – the **balance of nuclear forces** (numbers) became far less relevant to strategic stability because US-Russia relations improved. US-Russia security was always about the health and stability of the relationship; it was never really about the balance of nuclear weapons.

US BMD has also become far less destabilizing after the Cold War because **Russian officials** understand that the system is designed to address new and emerging nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran; BMD does not undermine Moscow’s second-strike capability.

Critics also continue to dismiss BMD technology as worthless, despite compelling evidence from testing records showing measurable progress over time.6 According to recent updates provided by the congressionally monitored US Missile Defence Agency (MDA), the sea-based Aegis BMD platform (to address missile threats during the boost and ascent phases) has generated 28 intercepts in 34 at-sea attempts since 2002. The Ground-Based (Midcourse) program produced 8 successes out of 16 attempts, and 3 of 5 successful intercepts using “operationally configured interceptors” since 1999. With respect to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (to address a missile threats at the final stage), the MDA reports 11 out of 11 interceptions since 2006. Not a bad record for worthless technology.

64 of 80 (80%) hit-to-kill intercept attempts have been successful across all programs since the integrated system began development in 2001.

43 of 55 (78%) hit-to-kill intercept attempts have been achieved for THAAD, Aegis BMD, and GMD test programs since 2001.

BMD cynics are correct to point out that the current US/NATO BMD systems are technologically incapable of protecting against a full-blown attack by Russia or China, but this is a stabilizing feature of BMD limitations - the system is obviously not designed to threaten the deterrent capabilities of Russia or China, and that’s a good thing.

Critics also mistakenly predicted US BMD would lead to massive increases in China’s defence expenditures and nuclear program, yet no such proliferation (e.g., military spending as a percentage of GDP) has occurred, for two straightforward reasons: China remains comfortably committed to a strategy of minimum deterrence (not massive proliferation), and, once again, officials in Beijing understand that US BMD is not designed to undermine the credibility of their deterrent capability.

What we are witnessing instead is unprecedented cooperation between the US and China, including tacit acceptance by China of accelerated US BMD deployments to Guam and South Korea (in March 2013) to address an increasingly antagonistic and nuclearized North Korea. Beijing officials are growing increasingly weary of supporting a regime that does nothing to contribute to China’s efforts to build a reputation as a responsible global leader.

In fact, Chinese President Xi Jinping issued an unprecedented rebuke of North Korean leaders following the March 2013 crisis with South Korea: “no country should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain.” North Korea’s nuclear test in January 2013 was the tipping point for Chinese leaders, pushing them to endorse a US sponsored, unanimous UN resolution imposing harsh economic sanctions against Pyongyang.

The Canadian government’s official assessment of the nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation risks and threats from North Korea is also very clear:7

North and South (Korea) technically remain at war, as hostilities were concluded with an armistice, not a peace treaty. Canada remains gravely concerned about North Korea’s provocative and destabilizing actions, such as nuclear and missile tests and related proliferation, as well as egregious human rights abuses.

Canadian officials clearly acknowledge that the regime in North Korea poses a serious threat to global security, particularly after the launch in December 2012 of the Unha-3 rocket - a three-stage, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with an estimated range of 10,000 kilometers.

When combined with North Korea’s latest underground nuclear test in January 2013, these moves represent a concerted effort by the regime to develop and deploy an offensive nuclear capability that will:

Pose a direct threat to the United States, Canada, and our allies in Asia and Europe;

**Diminish our coercive leverage** in subsequent military security crises involving North and South Korea;

**Weaken** the **credibility of our commitment** to protect South Korea;

**Seriously undermine** our ongoing commitment and **obligation to contribute to peace** and stability on the **Korean peninsula**; and

Increase the probability of nuclear proliferation in the region.

Consider the following responses in recent polls conducted by the Assan Institute for Policy Studies – “Fallout from North Korea Nuclear Test, January 2013”.8

American and Canadian officials understand the importance of strengthening security guarantees to South Korea and Japan as a way of controlling proliferation, and BMD is a vital part of that overall strategy. Jonathan Trexel (2013) provides an excellent summary of the benefits of missile defence and its effects on North Korea’s strategic calculations - BMD will:

Enhance the credibility of US commitments to allies by protecting Washington’s freedom of action;

Increases the credibility of US deterrence by punishment - extended nuclear deterrence is less credible;

Adversaries are more likely to view US as willing to take risks (intervene) if protected by BMD;

BMD increases adversary uncertainties and complicates the probability of achieving their goals;

Denies or confounds military and political benefits sought by the adversary;

Creates a more formidable and resolute coalition;

Prevents South Korea and Japan from contemplating deployment of their own nuclear deterrent.

In 2013, 66% of South Koreans support domestic nuclear program (2013); it was 48% in 2012

In 2012, 48% trusted the US nuclear deterrent commitment; it was 55% in 2011

These benefits largely explain why NATO allies (including Canada) have concluded that deployment of BMD technologies is among the only defensive options available to reinforce the West’s commitment, resolve and capability to protect key allies against nuclear blackmail. Consider the emerging and overwhelming consensus on this issue:

#### South Korean and Japanese proliferation causes regional arms racing and nuclear war

Terry 16 [Sue Mi Terry, a managing director for Bower Group Asia, is a former senior North Korea analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency., "An American Nuclear Umbrella Means a Lot to Northeast Asia," No Publication, 10-26-2016, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/10/26/a-nuclear-arsenal-upgrade/an-american-nuclear-umbrella-means-a-lot-to-northeast-asia?mcubz=1, DS]

There are growing calls from South Korean lawmakers in the conservative, ruling Saenuri Party to develop nuclear weapons — an option that was endorsed by [54 percent](https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/08/116_210829.html) of those surveyed by Gallup Korea in January 2016. What would happen if South Korea were to go nuclear? Japan would follow suit. And then we would be in the midst of a dangerous and destabilizing nuclear-arms race involving Japan, South Korea, North Korea and China, similar to the nuclear competition that already exists between India and Pakistan. The chances of a catastrophic conflict would greatly increase. That would not be in the interests of Northeast Asia or in the interests of America.

### Arctic Leverage Adv---1AC

#### Canadian BMD integration revitalizes US Canada relations and gives them leverage in the arctic to push back against Russia

Jordan 16 [Rojer Jordan is a writer for global researcher citing numerous think tank reports, “Canada Preparing to Join US Ballistic Missile Defense”, 5-4-2016, https://www.globalresearch.ca/canada-preparing-to-join-us-ballistic-missile-defense/5523460] IanM

Another significant consideration in the reopening of the missile defence debate is the increased focus in policymaking circles on the Arctic. The US and Canada have seized on Russian military operations on its domestic territory in the Arctic to present Moscow as an aggressive player in the region that must be confronted. A number of reports and comments, including a study by the Conference of Defence Associations and the defence policy review consultation paper itself, point to concerns over the supposed **dearth of Canadian military equipment** and personnel in the region.

Canada’s full integration into the missile defence system would give it additional leverage in its moves to **extend its territorial claims** in the area around the North Pole, where it is directly **being challenged by counter-claims** from Russia. Fellow NATO-member Denmark has also submitted its own claim to a large swathe of the Arctic Ocean, based on its control of Greenland, including waters and ocean-floor coveted by Canada.

While the Harper government was considering joining BMD prior to last year’s election, the ruling elite concluded that the increased militarization of Canadian foreign policy and its further integration into US war plans against Russia and China could best be prepared with a Liberal government seeking to sell this reactionary agenda to the public behind a wave of “progressive” rhetoric. Sections of the ruling elite are concerned that this will become much more difficult should Republican frontrunner Donald Trump enter the White House after the US election this November.

The Liberals were discussing plans to deepen ties with US imperialism long before coming to power. Last June, Trudeau delivered an important speech calling for “real change” in Canada-US relations. One of his central demands was greater continental policy coordination between Washington and Ottawa to better project their common interests on a range of issues. This topic has been raised again in the current debate. Proponents of Canada’s participation in BMD argue that the current situation in which Canadian Armed Forces’ personnel are active in NORAD, which is responsible for providing radar data to the BMD system, but **have no say in how** the missile defense system is positioned and used, is untenable and poses a grave danger to Canadian geopolitical interests.

Barely two weeks after the Liberals’ sweeping victory in the October 19 election, the Centre on International Policy Studies think-tank issued a report urging the new government to reverse the missile defense decision as part of its declared goal of “reengaging” Canada on the global stage. One of the report’s authors, Bob McRae, Canada’s former ambassador to NATO, provocatively proclaimed at a public forum held at the University of Ottawa as the study was released, “Splendid isolation is not an option for Canada.”

At the same time, Sajjan received briefing material from the military, as part of his transition into office, which underlines the top brass’s support for BMD. “The strategic importance of ballistic missile defense,” said one briefing paper, “has increased in recent years.”

#### Lack of pushback from Canada in the arctic lets Russia AND China dominate

Fisher 9-25 [Matthew Fisher is an international affairs columnist and foreign correspondent who has worked abroad for 35 years, “COMMENTARY: Canada needs an Arctic defence strategy as Russia, China eye the north”, 9-25-2020, https://globalnews.ca/news/7355425/canada-arctic-defence/] IanM

The crew of a U.S. Coast Guard cutter was surprised this summer to find the Chinese and Russian navies conducting a joint exercise in open water in the Arctic Ocean.

Details about what was apparently a serendipitous discovery of the Chinese and Russian vessels by the U.S. Coast Guard were sparse.

Until this chance encounter near the top of the world, Western countries with an interest in the Far North, such as Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, the United Kingdom, France and the United States, were unaware of what was going on, a former commandant of the coast guard told a recent virtual conference hosted by the Defense News.

The intelligence lapse was telling. The U.S. and its allies, including Canada, are doing more in Arctic waters in response to [global warming](https://globalnews.ca/tag/climate-change/) and Russian and Chinese military activities and shipping there.

Despite underwater monitoring systems, as the U.S. Coast Guard found out, potential enemies are probably doing a lot more there than is generally known. A major shortcoming, according to Defense News, is that satellites tend to be oriented toward more target-rich environments that are a lot farther south.

American and British submarines, and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which has naturally been more concerned with the air domain, have been building up their ability to monitor the northern, western and eastern approaches to the continent. What is lacking is a common western strategy to defend the Arctic or the fantastic oil, gas, mineral and fisheries reserves that lie within or near Canadian, American and Greenlandic territory up there.

Canada’s approach has been typical. During the five years that Prime Minister [Justin Trudeau](https://globalnews.ca/tag/justin-trudeau/) has been in power, there has been almost no talk about doing anything in Canada’s north, let alone consideration of an Arctic strategy, either with the military or in concert with the Inuit.

Were Conservative Leader [Erin O’Toole](https://globalnews.ca/tag/erin-otoole/) to become prime minister, he has said that he would make building up Canadian defences in the north a priority. The stumbling block for any government is that building and maintaining anything in the Arctic is hugely expensive and the national debt has been growing by the minute this year.

Any attention from the politicians would be greatly appreciated by the tiny band of Canadian academics and even smaller group of journalists who take this issue seriously. For Canadians, it should be as much a question of sovereignty (use it or lose it) as of devising a policy to protect it or exert control over the vast, fragile environment.

Politicians are not the only ones to blame for this historic lack of interest in the Canadian Arctic. They take their cue from Canadians, including educators, who often claim a great sentimental attachment to the north but have never pressed their governments to do anything about it.

There are **glimmers of hope**. The Canadian Coast Guard is in the High Arctic every summer and fall. The Canadian Armed Forces has been testing unmanned sensors and underwater microphones. The Royal Canadian Navy has operated in Baffin Bay and the Beaufort Sea in recent years, sailing with the Canadian and U.S. coast guards and European and American warships. Canada’s navy, air force and army participated in a major NATO land, sea and air exercise two years ago in Norway.

The RCAF has been busy nearer home this summer, dispatching CF-18 Hornets to intercept Russian strategic bombers, fighter jets and reconnaissance aircraft escorting top-of-the-line U.S. air force bombers on long exercises across the Canadian North.

Ordered 13 years ago by the government of former prime minister Stephen Harper, the Royal Canadian Navy now has two of its eight De Wolfe class Arctic patrol vessels in the water. While the RCN is happy to have anything new after decades of government neglect, the De Wolfe class ships have limited ice-breaking capability and cannot operate in the High Arctic during the winter.

The least expensive way for Canada to get a better grip on what Russia and China are doing in and near its territory is to have much better intelligence from satellites and relatively inexpensive surface and underwater monitoring systems. The best way to monitor the polar region is with under-ice capable submarines, though each one will cost close to $1 billion.

If Canada is serious about its Arctic interests, it **needs to finally deliver** its long-discussed new icebreakers, which cost nearly $800 million each. As for subs, recent technological breakthroughs by the Japanese have produced batteries that make it possible for the first time for non-nuclear submarines to operate under the ice cap for many weeks at a time.

Russia has about 40 old icebreakers and is building a fleet of at least 13 modern Polar Star icebreakers designed to cut through as much as three metres of ice. After several years of technical glitches, the biggest icebreaker ever built finally left St. Petersburg a few days ago to begin its first Arctic mission.

President Vladimir Putin has been **pouring resources** into Russia’s north. It has 13 military airfields, top-of-the-line anti-aircraft missile batteries up there, and has been sending a new generation of submarines to its Northern Fleet. Thousands of combat troops have been posted to new or refurbished Cold War-era bases along the Arctic coast or on Arctic islands. Though it has been hard to figure out why, Moscow has even put tanks above the Arctic Circle.

China, which has declared itself “a near Arctic state,” is a new factor. Beijing has two medium-strength icebreakers, is building the first of a new class of much more powerful icebreakers, and, ominously, has said it regards the north as an area for all countries to exploit.

The clock is ticking. If Canada wishes to have any influence over what happens on its northern border, Ottawa and its allies will have to prioritize developing an Arctic defence strategy and spend a lot of money. Otherwise, it will be another easy victory for Russia and China.

#### Russian arctic domination crushes freedom of navigation – Canadian pushback solves

Holmes 19 [[James Holmes](https://navaldiplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/) is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College, coauthor of “[Red Star over the Pacific](https://navaldiplomat.com/new-book-red-star-over-the-pacific-2nd-edition/)” (second edition newly released), and author of “[A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy](https://navaldiplomat.com/new-book-a-brief-guide-to-maritime-strategy/%27)” (forthcoming this November)., “Don't let Russia create a 'Caribbean' in the Arctic”, 3-27-2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/435685-dont-let-russia-create-a-caribbean-in-the-arctic] IanM

Yogi Berra [wisecracked](https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/261863-it-s-tough-to-make-predictions-especially-about-the-future) that “it’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future,” but even the legendary baseball philosopher could have seen this one coming: Russia covets absolute control of events along its Arctic frontier. The ice retreats for longer each year, rendering polar waters increasingly navigable. Ice-free waters beckon to navies and merchant fleets, offering a convenient, shorter and cheaper pathway between ports of call. Moscow is pondering how to manage the new normal of heavy traffic along its northern periphery.

Over at Eurasia Daily Monitor, Pavel **Felgenhauer** has compiled an invaluable roundup of debates within the Duma and officialdom over what rights and privileges to claim in the **N**orthern **S**ea **R**oute, the sea lane that skirts along Russian coastlines between the Barents and Bering seas.

Deliberations have taken on sinister overtones. Judging from the official and news sources Felgenhauer catalogs, Moscow appears poised to enact laws and regulations that go far, far beyond what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea — the closest thing the world has to a constitution governing the world’s oceans and seas — permits in a coastal state’s “territorial sea” the 12-nautical-mile belt of water that lies just offshore.

For example, Putin & Co. evidently will assert jurisdiction over foreign shipping farther offshore than the law of the sea allows, where the Northern Sea Route widens beyond 12 nautical miles. Worse, Russia may reserve the right to bar “innocent passage” through the territorial sea — a right explicitly affirmed by the convention — for any reason. Or, for no reason at all. And, worst of all, partisans of the forceful approach want to sink any craft that defies Russian mandates while traversing the Arctic seaway.

One hopes sobriety will prevail in the end. But if Moscow embraces even some of these measures and gets away with it, it will have set a dangerous precedent: that a strong coastal state may amend or annul the law of the sea by fiat because it wants to, and because it boasts sufficient armed might to enforce its policies.

Or rather, it will have reinforced the precedent set by China, which [asserts title](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2185718/beijing-insists-indisputable-sovereignty-over-south-china-sea) to most of the South China Sea — including waters and stretches of seabed [allocated](http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm) to fellow Southeast Asian states for fishing and undersea mining. Last November, Russia struck a Chinese note, [laying claim](https://news.yahoo.com/sea-azov-ukraine-russia-flashpoint-114438760.html) to the Sea of Azov, an inlet in the Black Sea. And now its Eye of Sauron has alighted on the Arctic Ocean.

And why not? If the **international community** lets one coastal state abridge the freedoms enshrined in the law of the sea, **there is no reason** in principle why other would-be hegemons shouldn’t follow suit. The law of the jungle — the law that might makes right — **could return** to the nautical realm over time **if** China and **Russia make good on their ambitions**. That prospect should goad the seafaring world to band together against lawlessness. Whether it does remains to be seen.

But there’s more to this story than legal opportunism. **Great powers** commonly display a proprietary attitude toward waters that lap against their seacoasts. Nor is this a peculiarly Russian, European or Western thing. It straddles historic epochs and civilizational boundaries. During their imperial heyday, **Romans** referred to the Mediterranean Sea breezily as mare nostrum, meaning “our sea.” **Persians** took pride in the fact that the Gulf bore their nation’s name; so do their **Iranian descendants**. Ditto for **India** and the Indian Ocean, and **China** and the China seas.

Examples are legion.

One of the most compelling comes from 19th- and early 20th-century U.S. history, the age of the Monroe Doctrine. A confluence of events around the turn of the century prompted Americans to assert special prerogatives in the Caribbean Sea basin. At the time, it was becoming plain that a canal finally would be dug across Central America, shortening voyages between Atlantic and Pacific seaports by thousands of miles. Meanwhile, Caribbean governments were taking out loans from European banks that they could not or would not repay. After a default, common practice was to dispatch the fleet to seize the debtor country’s custom houses and reimburse the bankers out of its tariff revenue.

Washington fretted that Europeans might build naval bases on the territory they occupied after a default — and afterward menace traffic bound to or from the canal. Strategically-minded U.S. leaders blanched at this prospect. Consequently, they asserted a right to intervene in Caribbean finances to prevent Europeans from ensconcing warships in America’s backyard in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. President Theodore Roosevelt made it formal in 1904, announcing a “corollary” to the doctrine [whereby](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/roosevelt-and-monroe-doctrine) the United States would exercise an “international police power” as a last resort when “chronic wrongdoing” or governmental “impotence” threatened to bring hostile navies to America’s door.

In other words, this rising great power claimed the right to mediate between Latin American governments and European great powers, and to project naval force within its near abroad to forestall threats from the sea. China and Russia are merely doing the same, right? Well, no. Washington was meddlesome at times. By the 1920s, in fact, the State Department disavowed the Roosevelt Corollary because it stoked such rancor in Latin America. But the United States never claimed sovereignty — ownership — over the Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico the way Moscow appears set to claim sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route and perhaps beyond.

Russian ambitions vastly outstrip fin de siècle America’s.

Will Russia get away with it? Will the Arctic become its frigid Caribbean, a saltwater preserve where Moscow makes the rules and others obey? Maybe. But the smart money argues against it. Consider the **geopolitical setting**. In power-politics terms, the Arctic Ocean resembles the South China Sea or Caribbean Sea — semi-enclosed bodies of water populated by one musclebound coastal state and a host of outmatched neighbors — less than it resembles the Mediterranean Sea. The Mediterranean is an expanse ringed by multiple great powers alongside not-so-great seafaring states. Balance prevails for the most part.

So it is in polar waters. **NATO** members, including the **U**nited **S**tates itself, **comprise** much of the **Arctic rim**. Their capacity to defy bullying vastly outstrips that of ASEAN in the South China Sea, let alone the revolution-wracked Caribbean states of Roosevelt’s day. NATO allies can push back — if they will.

The warlike talk emanating from Moscow could prove galvanic, **inducing allied capitals** to **rouse themselves** and **harness their immense diplomatic** **and military potential** to **defend freedom** of the **sea**. Felgenhauer quotes Adm. James Foggo, the commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe, who last month [declared](https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/its-nobodys-lake-us-admiral-warns-china-and-russia-over-arctic) that the Arctic Ocean is “nobody’s lake.”

#### That undermines the law of the seas---triggers naval wars and collapses norms which solve piracy, terrorism, trade, and prolif

Kraska 12 [James Kraska is the Howard S. Levie Chair in International Law at the Naval War College, a guest investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Global Swing States and the Maritime Order,” <http://www.gmfus.org/file/2795/download>, y2k]

The “global swing states” — Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey — will play an important role in shaping the future maritime order. Unlike major naval powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, the four swing states currently lack a worldwide impact. They do, however, possess a preponderance of regional influence over oceans governance and have a mixed record of promoting a stable and liberal order at sea.

At the same time, each of the four has made strides over the past decade toward adopting a more even-handed approach and accepting some of the diffuse costs of maintaining the maritime order. India, in particular, is moving toward a more global view of oceans governance. The South Asian giant is making massive investments in naval capabilities and airpower to back up its new role as the sheriff of the Indian Ocean. Indonesia, stung by China’s overreaching claims in the South China Sea, now has a more balanced view of maritime security than in the past and expresses increasing appreciation of the importance of freedom of the seas for foreign flagged ships. Brazil and Turkey have promoted relatively insular positions in matters of oceans governance. These two emerging powers are more occupied with their own prerogatives in offshore development than with strengthening the system more generally.

All four swing states have been major beneficiaries of an open order of the oceans, in which free trade and freedom to use the seas have stoked their economies and broadened their contacts with regional states and distant partners. For some, their past inward focus compelled them to view the oceans as a source of vulnerability rather than as a window on the world. Now these nations stand at an inflection point. Growing power and increasing regional influence provide them with the opportunity to assume greater roles in a stronger and more open order of the oceans — one in which growing maritime trade underscores the importance of collaborative approaches to security at sea.

The Order of the Oceans

Oceans governance derives from the classic model of a global commons, a perennial metaphor for thinking about shared space. The benefits of operating in the oceans are diffuse and shared by all states; no nation may purport to establish exclusive control over the seas. As a physical domain of movement, the seas are governed by a juridical and political framework that developed over the past 400 years and is infused with a sense of fairness in apportioning rights and responsibilities among the users of the oceans. Balancing this perspective, coastal states and port states exercise exclusive sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over prescribed parts of the sea.

The global order of the oceans is composed of complementary legal regimes and norms. The overarching framework is codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although UNCLOS is comprehensive — addressing conduct on, over, and under more than 70 percent of the world’s surface — many of its provisions are aspirational, providing broad policy direction rather than dictating specific regulations. As an umbrella treaty, UNCLOS combines historic state practices with new rules to establish a shared vision among competing interests for using and managing the oceans.

Some 50 additional maritime treaties and hundreds of codes and guidelines complement the legal architecture of UNCLOS, focusing on every aspect of oceans activity — from piracy to pollution. Most of the supplementary rules originate with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the U.N. agency that handles maritime matters. Legal ambiguity and contending visions and interpretations of rules and norms, however, mar the legal order of the oceans, eroding stability and exposing rifts in interpretation and state practice among nations and regions.

The law of the sea is supplemented, amplified, and extended by numerous treaties and other formal and informal agreements designed to promote economic prosperity, protect the marine environment, and enhance maritime stability and security. For example, the 1974 International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea not only reflects standards for the safe operation of ships on international voyages but also includes a global template for ship and port facility security. Similarly, the 1995 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers provides authority for port states to detain foreign-flagged ships that pose a potential danger to persons, property, or the environment.

These legal regimes are supported by states that champion freedom of navigation and make contributions to maritime constabulary operations to defeat piracy, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the principle of freedom of navigation is enshrined in UNCLOS, only the United States and a handful of other nations routinely promote it. U.S. warships and aircraft tangibly demonstrate non-acquiescence to excessive maritime claims by coastal states. A few other maritime powers — Singapore and Australia, for example — occasionally may issue a diplomatic protest over excessive maritime claims, but no other country approaches the issue with the persistence and seriousness of the United States.

In recent years, Somali piracy in the western Indian Ocean and roving pirate gangs in Southeast Asia have disrupted the flow of international commercial shipping. Countering these threats generally requires the commitment of warships and surveillance aircraft, as well as the willingness to criminally prosecute or extradite suspected offenders. Beginning with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816 of June 2, 2008, naval forces from more than 40 nations have answered the call to patrol the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to suppress Somali piracy. The European Union and NATO conduct routine patrols in the area, protecting World Food Program shipments into Somalia, escorting commercial traffic through the Gulf of Aden south of the Suez Canal, and providing a constabulary presence in the Indian Ocean.

Aside from piracy, terrorists and WMD present perhaps the greatest challenges to security at sea. It has been nearly a decade since the United States and ten other core states1 met in Kraków, Poland, to launch the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global effort to arrest the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and related material to and from states and terrorist groups. As a mechanism to facilitate interdiction, the initiative complements existing treaties and multilateral export control regimes. Dozens of interdictions have occurred under PSI enforcing U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iran and North Korea and, more generally, hampering the shadowy trade in nuclear material and ballistic missiles in Asia and the Middle East.

The legal doctrine of freedom of navigation represents a balanced approach to the maritime order — one in which the rights of other countries are respected as much as the resource entitlements of coastal states. Over the past 30 years, freedom of the seas has facilitated a manifold expansion in world trade, enabled globalization, and lifted countless millions out of poverty. The existing balance between coastal states’ rights and freedom of navigation has worked well for all nations, but it is under stress from excessive legal claims over the oceans by coastal states. Beijing asserts sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, for example. The swing states have also asserted greater maritime control than UNCLOS accords them. These key countries can either promote a liberal order of the oceans based on shared or inclusive legal regimes or instead cling to an exclusive maritime vision that is out of sync with the law of the sea.

#### Chinese naval expansion escalates border disputes with India

Ganguly 20 [Sumit Ganguly is a Foreign Policy columnist. He is also a distinguished professor of political science and the Rabindranath Tagore chair in Indian cultures and civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington. Manjeet S. Pardesi is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and the Acting Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. “Why We Should Worry About China and India’s Border Skirmishes,” 5-23, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/23/india-china-border-skirmishes/#:~:text=Tensions%20between%20India%20and%20China,engaged%20in%20several%20small%20skirmishes.&text=It%20is%20believed%20that%20the,military%20patrols%20in%20the%20area>, y2k]

A new economic dynamic means that the underlying bedrock of the Gandhi-Deng bargain—of similar means and goals—is fizzling out. Although it remains unclear when exactly the understanding between New Delhi and Beijing began to fade—most likely after the 2008 global financial crisis—China has become far more assertive in its foreign affairs in recent years, from artificial-island-building activities in the South China Sea to its muscular diplomacy amid the coronavirus pandemic. Indeed, some scholars have argued that an impending power transition is underway between China and the United States, the current global hegemon. While New Delhi has also become a more assertive player in global politics its rise has not been of much concern to the United States.

China and India’s recent border clashes look increasingly worrying in the context of these changing power dynamics. The Gandhi-Deng bargain paved the way for a number of border management agreements (including the 1993 and 1996 agreements related to confidence-building measures and the 2005 agreement on the political parameters guiding boundary negotiations). More recently, high-profile summits between the two countries’ top leaders—in Wuhan and in Mamallapuram—have played an important role in managing the overall relationship. However, even as the 1988 deal allowed relative tranquility along their border and promoted commercial links between China and India, none of their outstanding issues—including the border dispute—were actually resolved.

China and India find themselves in an “extraordinarily complex relationship,” according to Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister. In addition to the border dispute, some of the core issues in the Sino-Indian rivalry include Tibet (the presence of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan government-in-exile, and tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles in India), the burgeoning China-Pakistan partnership, and the two countries’ overlapping spheres of influence in Asia. These issues have become more salient in the context of the two countries’ simultaneous but asymmetric rising power. While India has risen as an economy and a global power in the past three decades, its relative strength to China has in fact greatly declined

China and India’s material capabilities remain in flux; China continues to outstrip India along most axes of power even as New Delhi seeks to boost its own capabilities. According to the World Bank, India recorded higher growth rates than China every year between 2014 and 2018. While the long-term economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic remains unclear, India’s smaller economy and marginally faster growth rates mean that it has the potential to narrow its power gap with China—at least in the long term. In other words, India is the only major power that is rising with respect to China—even as China grows faster than other major powers such as Japan and the United States.

In addition to accruing power domestically, India is also building strong strategic partnerships with China’s other rivals, especially the United States and Japan. Meanwhile, a rising China has stabilized its northern borders with Russia and is working to undermine the United States’ primacy in the East Asian maritime commons through the modernization of its military and its push to build islands. This basically leaves only one border issue with a rival unresolved: namely, the Sino-Indian border. It is hardly surprising that it is exerting periodic pressure on India along this front—a trend that is only likely to escalate.

As China and India continue with their ascent, China will increasingly see India as an impertinent rival unwilling to settle the border dispute on terms favorable to China. The ongoing fragmentation of the global trading system (through tariffs and restrictions on investments), as well as a trend of rising nationalism around the world, will further test Sino-Indian relations because trade negotiations are likely to become more fraught and contentious. Indeed, given that Beijing sees New Delhi as the principal impediment to the realization of its ambitions to dominate Asia, a more violent clash along the volatile, poorly demarcated Sino-Indian border is highly likely. Unless China emerges as the dominant power in South Asia (and the Indian Ocean), China is likely to remain a regional power in East Asia. Put another way, China’s quest for pan-Asian dominance will intensify the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry as India itself is seeking primacy—but not hegemony—in southern Asia.

To avert a conflict spiral India will need to pursue a multifaceted strategy which will need to include cooperative elements such as summit diplomacy and working together in international institutions such the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the New Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. But while these cooperative endeavors could forestall more border violence, they will not address core outstanding issues in Sino-Indian relations. Short of making significant territorial concessions, there is little that India can do to assuage the underlying sources of the rivalry.

#### Goes nuclear

Dalton 20 [Toby Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order. “At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash,” 8-19, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/19/at-crossroads-china-india-nuclear-relations-after-border-clash-pub-82489>, y2k]

From our research and interviews, it is difficult to determine whether this Chinese optimism is well founded. One interview subject, for instance, wondered aloud, “If India faces territorial defeat [to China], do nuclear weapons come into play?”27 A serious conventional conflict over the border seems more plausible after the deadly fistfight in the Galwan Valley.28 Although no shots were fired during the clash due to a decades-long confidence-building measure to ban the use of firearms, after the incident, India reportedly altered its rules of military engagement to permit the use of firearms near the Line of Actual Control, increasing the risk that disputes will result in casualties.29

In recent years, some Chinese experts have observed that India’s military strategy toward China is shifting to “fighting short high-intensity wars,” which could increase escalation pressures in a more compressed timeline.30 The fog of war could become thicker if future high-intensity border conflicts involve interference or destruction of situational awareness capabilities early in the fight, making misperception, misunderstanding, and misjudgment more likely.

“NEW TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE ENTANGLED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE MORE IMPORTANT FOR STABILITY THAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEMSELVES.”31

If a border dispute were to escalate into a larger military confrontation, additional inadvertent escalation risks could come from the co-location or mixing of nuclear and conventional missiles and the challenges of distinguishing between nuclear and non-nuclear systems. Most Indian and Chinese dual-capable military assets are theater-range (short-, medium-, and intermediate-range) weapons, whereas strategic, long-range missiles are exclusively armed with nuclear weapons. As noted earlier, China’s theater-range, dual-capable weapons include the DF-21 and DF-26.32 India’s dual-capable systems include fighter bomber aircraft; short-range missiles like Prithvi, Prahaar, and Agni-I; and perhaps also the medium-range Agni-II ballistic missile.33 If dual-capable weapons and their associated equipment and facilities were destroyed in a conventional attack against, for example, India’s Ambala Air Force Station or China’s missile facilities near Korla, the attacked party could wonder whether the strike was aimed deliberately at its nuclear assets and whether a response in-kind—or even a direct nuclear retaliation—could be necessary. This risk is not completely theoretical. Some reports suggest that PLA strategists may be contemplating the early use of missile strikes against Indian air bases.34 And at least some Chinese experts assess that “the Indian army and air force may not have the capacity or will to distinguish nuclear facilities from conventional targets.”35

Also posing a risk of nuclear use is the Chinese and Indian deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines in the open oceans, potentially subjecting their nuclear weapons to greater threat of destruction by conventional forces. Although there is no evidence that China is deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to the Indian Ocean, India may view China’s diesel-electric and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) operating in the Indian Ocean as a threat to its incipient SSBN force, especially during periods of heightened military tension. Similarly, some Chinese strategists are concerned that in a bilateral military conflict, India may send its attack submarines to the South China Sea to intercept Chinese naval forces sailing to the Indian Ocean. The South China Sea is reportedly the main operating area for China’s SSBNs,36 and the deployment of Indian attack submarines there could significantly increase Chinese concerns about their security.

#### Piracy causes oil tanker attacks

Chalk 8 [Peter Chalk, adjunct political scientist at the RAND Corporation, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States,” <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf>, y2k]

The Dangers of Piracy

The dangers associated with contemporary piracy are complex and multifaceted. At the most basic level, attacks constitute a direct threat to the lives and welfare of the citizens of a variety of flag states. Piracy also has a direct economic impact in terms of fraud, stolen cargos, and delayed trips, and could potentially undermine a maritime state’s trading ability. Politically, piracy can play a pivotal role in undermining and weakening regime legitimacy by encouraging corruption among elected government officials. Finally, attacks have the potential to trigger a major environmental disaster, particularly if they take place in crowded sea-lanes traversed by heavily laden oil tankers.

#### That kills ocean sustainability

Ralby 18 [Ian Ralby, Senior Fellow @ Atlantic Council, “Oil on the water: Illicit hydrocarbons activity in the maritime domain,” 4-10, [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/oil-on-the-water-illicit-hydrocarbons-activity-in-the-maritime-domain/+&cd=24&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/oil-on-the-water-illicit-hydrocarbons-activity-in-the-maritime-domain/%2B%26cd%3D24%26hl%3Den%26ct%3Dclnk%26gl%3Dus), y2k]

As pervasive as hydrocarbons crime is, its scope is rarely understood, and its effects are seldom mitigated. The movement of both oil and fuel on the water is so commonplace that few would even recognize illicit activity committed in front of them in broad daylight. Furthermore, many are willing to turn a blind eye toward what may seem to be just a few jerry cans full of fuel on the deck of a fishing boat, or a clever scheme to get cheaper fuel. In some quarters, even larger-scale oil and fuel theft might be seen as benign, a simple skimming off the top of vast corporate profits or government revenues. Moreover, those technically responsible for combating hydrocarbons crime may lack the necessary capacity to address it, be overwhelmed by more “high-profile” crimes like drug or human trafficking, or, in fact, collude in the illicit activities. Regardless, the consequences of letting hydrocarbons crime flourish are dire. The movement of both oil and fuel on the water is so commonplace that few would even recognize illicit activity committed in front of them in broad daylight. To begin with, oil theft often means lost revenues for governments struggling to provide essential services. In impoverished and underserved regions around the world, people turn to black-market diesel to cook their meals and heat their homes, when millions or even billions in tax revenues from stolen fuel might have provided them access to the benefits of an electrical grid. In a more sinister way, hydrocarbons crime goes hand in hand with trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons. It drives piracy. It heightens the possibility of environmental catastrophe—as in the Niger Delta, where systematic oil theft has devastated one of the world’s richest ecosystems. It also funds transnational organized crime, militancy, and terrorism. Whether it be the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the Middle East and the Philippines, militant groups in Thailand and the Niger Delta, or criminal cartels in Latin America and Southeast Asia, oil and fuel theft finances destructive and destabilizing activities. For the sake of the global economy, energy stability, the sustainability of the marine environment, and international security, the maritime domain cannot be allowed to continue playing host to the illicit oil and fuel activities currently under way.

#### Extinction

Baker 20 [Aryn Baker, TIME's Africa Bureau Chief, “Why This Year Is Our Last, Best Chance for Saving the Oceans,” 7-9, <https://time.com/5863821/saving-the-oceans/#:~:text=Human%20beings%20owe%20their%20life,a%20year%E2%80%94and%20medical%20advancement>, y2k]

Human beings owe their life to the sea. Four in 10 humans rely on the ocean for food. Marine life produces 70% of our oxygen; 90% of global goods travel via shipping lanes. We turn to the sea for solace—ocean-based tourism in the U.S. alone is worth $124 billion a year—and medical advancement. An enzyme used for COVID-19 testing was originally sourced from bacteria found in the ocean’s hydro-thermal vents. The ocean also acts as a giant planetary air conditioner. Over the past century, the ocean has absorbed 93% of the heat trapped in the atmosphere by greenhouse-gas emissions. “If all that heat hadn’t been taken up by the ocean, we’d all be living in Death Valley conditions by now,” says marine-conservation biologist Callum Roberts at the U.K.’s University of York.

### NORAD Adv---1AC

#### Failure to integrate Canada into US BMD architecture limits US BMD AND guts NORAD

Sokolsky 14 [Joel Sokolsky is the 2013-14 Killam Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies at Bridgewater State where he is teaching courses in Political Science. He is the former Principal of Royal Military College of Canada, “U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense, NORAD and the Canada Conundrum”, May 2014, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48834127.pdf] IanM

In NORAD, then, Canada and the US appear to have established a firm, perennial institution with flexibility enough to accommodate asymmetries in command at Colorado Springs. While Canada does not participate in the operation of missile defences, Canadians in NORAD support the system by providing warning and assessment of any potential missile attack. This arrangement can lead to some oddities at Colorado Springs. For example, a Canadian general officer in command of NORAD would be able to confirm that North America is under missile attack and provide the warning, but must leave it to an American to release the BMD interceptors.

However, notwithstanding the 2006 renewal and accommodation, the Canadian decision to stay out of BMD still leaves NORAD’s future as a binational command in jeopardy. This is because, as James Fergusson of the University of Manitoba points out in his 2010 book Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009, “NORAD’s early warning mission appear[s] at risk of becoming a redundancy.” Known as Integrated Tactical Warning and Assessment or “ITT/WA,” wherein air and missile warning and attack assessment functions are brought together, early warning is at the very heart of NORAD’s mission. And very recently, the stakes have been raised. The Obama administration’s policy reversal on BMD and Secretary Hagel’s announcement of an expansion of the system indicates a new seriousness about missile defense that highlights the differences between Washington and Ottawa on BMD. If the U.S. proceeds with a more extensive BMD system, the **existing accommodations** within NORAD to the continued Canadian aversion to BMD may not be possible nor in the United States’ best interest. Americans may in other words get over their habit of cooperating with Canadians and decide to effectively gut NORAD by unilaterally taking ITT/WA away from the bi-national command.

Giving Up the Anti-BMD Habit Today, the Harper government has given no indication that it is considering pulling its own about face on BMD. But as the Obama administration and its successor move forward in expanding America’s ability to intercept missiles, Ottawa may have no choice if it wishes to maintain NORAD as a permanent and relevant substantive and symbolic fixture of American Canadian security cooperation. The price of sustaining the United States habit of cooperating with Canada in matters of continental defense is that Canadians give up their habit of rejecting ballistic missile defense. Given the stakes involved, it seems a small price to pay.

#### NORAD solves laundry list of impacts---specifically, drug trafficking, space debris, and natural disasters AND key to overall military integration of US and Canada---turns article 5 DA’s

Carafano et al 10 [James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Jena Baker McNeill is Policy Analyst for Homeland Security and Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Allison Center at The Heritage Foundation. Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political–Military Analysis at Hudson Institute, “Expand NORAD to Improve Security in North America”, 7-27-2020, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america] IanM

After the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War**, NORAD** has **evolved to address** a range of national security concerns. The National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989,[[8]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn8) requires the military to **aid law enforcement** agencies in combating drug trafficking in the United States, and the Canadian element of NORAD agreed to participate. In 1991, the anti-smuggling mission was made official, and NORAD’s **radar systems** and **interception procedures** were **shifted** from defense against bombers and missiles to **policing** against small **passenger planes** piloted by **smugglers,** primarily small planes **transporting cocaine** from South America.[[9]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn9) As a result, NORAD balloon-mounted radars have been placed mostly along the southern U.S. border. Meanwhile, North American air defenses were reduced after the Soviet bomber threat waned. “All the nuclear air defence weapons and all the fixed surface-to-air defence weapons are gone. Most of the radar sites have been closed.”[[10]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn10)

The successful terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, greatly altered NORAD operations. During the attacks, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration was notified of terrorist hijackings of four planes, but failed to warn NORAD in time.[[11]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn11) The attacks prompted a major increase in air defense over American cities, culminating in Operation Noble Eagle. **NORAD’s role** in security also **increased with** its **involvement** in Operation Noble Eagle to **include monitoring** and interception of flights, city and critical infrastructure air patrols, and controlling the airspace over Washington, D.C.[[12]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn12) From September 11, 2001, through 2008, NORAD monitored 2,700 unknown aircraft and directed more than 45,000 defensive sorties under Noble Eagle.[[13]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn13)

NORAD’s inability to detect and confront aerospace threats on 9/11 and Canada’s refusal to participate in missile defense have resulted in the de facto combination of NORAD with the newly created U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).[[14]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn14) As part of the post-9/11 reorganization of the federal government, NORTHCOM was created with an area of responsibility that includes the United States and its territories, Canada, Mexico, and adjacent bodies of water. Under the current arrangement, the commander of NORTHCOM is also the U.S. commander of NORAD, while the deputy commander of NORAD is still a Canadian officer. Even so, NORAD and NORTHCOM are separate commands that work closely together with civil defense partners to “deter, detect, prevent and defeat threats.”[[15]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn15) Canada Command (CANADACOM), NORTHCOM’s counterpart, has a strong relationship with both American commands and has worked closely with them to understand each other’s roles and responsibilities.[[16]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn16) The **commands have been emphasizing** **coordination of intelligence**, **cooperation in training** exercises, and **overall preparedness**.

Maritime warning responsibility was added to NORAD’s mandate in 2006, and the NORAD agreement was made permanent, ending the need to renegotiate it every five years. In 2008, the U.S. commander of NORTHCOM/NORAD and the Canadian commander of CANADACOM **signed a joint civil assistance plan** that further integrates the **U.S.** and **Canadian** **militaries by permitting them** to aid each other in the **event of** a natural disaster or terrorist attack.[[17]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn17)

**NORAD**’s current mission is to **provide aerospace** and **maritime warning** and control for North America.

Aerospace warning includes the **monitoring of** man-made objects in **space**, and the **detection,** **validation**, and **warning of attack** against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or **space vehicles**…. Aerospace control **includes ensuring** air sovereignty and air **defense** of the airspace of Canada and the United States.

The maritime warning mission, which was added in May 2006, “entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas, and inland waterways.”[[19]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn19) Complementary to **NORAD**, NORTHCOM is “**responsible for** homeland defense, sustaining continuous situational awareness and **readiness** to protect the United States **against a range** of **symmetric and asymmetric** threats in all domains.” This arrangement allows for coordination between Canadian and U.S. militaries through NORAD, while keeping control of actual combatant forces under each country’s military command designated for homeland defense (CANADACOM and NORTHCOM).[[20]](https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn20)

#### Uncontrolled drug trafficking triggers US-Iran war

Chang 19 --- Edward Chang is a defense, military, and foreign policy writer. His writing has appeared in The National Interest, The American Conservative, Real Clear Defense, and War Is Boring, “How A Mexican Drug Cartel Nearly Triggered War Between The U.S. And Iran”, Nov 2019, <https://thefederalist.com/2019/11/27/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-nearly-triggered-war-between-the-u-s-and-iran/> (BJN)

The massacre of nine dual-citizen American Mexican Mormons less than 100 miles from the border with the United States serves as a reminder of the dangers the cartels pose and the existence of one of the world’s deadliest wars in America’s own neighborhood. The Mexican drug war and cartels don’t preoccupy the national security/foreign policy establishment and the media the same way the Syrian civil war and Middle East militants do. But the conflict south of the border isn’t only getting worse, Latin America stands to pose a greater (if not the greatest) national security challenge for the United States in years to come. If policymakers, think tanks, and the media won’t sound the alarm now, they’ll have no choice but to do so later. That lesson was almost learned the hard way eight years ago, during Barack Obama’s presidency. A drug cartel was nearly responsible for the most devastating terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, one that could’ve sparked a war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. How Did This Almost Happen? On Oct. 11, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder and FBI Director Robert Mueller announced the plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Adel al-Jubeir had been foiled, and one of the suspects, U.S. citizen Manssor Arbabsiar, had been arrested. The other suspect, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force operative Gholam Shakuri, was never arrested and remains at large to this day. According to the Department of Justice, Jubeir’s assassination was plotted from spring to October 2011. Throughout the year, Arbabsiar went to Mexico to enlist the services of someone he believed was an associate of a Mexican drug cartel. Only it wasn’t — his contact was actually an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). In late May, Arbabsiar traveled from Texas to Mexico to solicit the services of the informant — who then notified U.S. authorities — for an attack against Saudi diplomatic personnel or facilities in the United States. Arbabsiar specifically inquired regarding the use of explosives, to which the informant advised him the cartel was proficient in the use of C-4 plastic explosives. Additional meetings took place in Mexico late June and mid July. There Arbabsiar told the informant his “associates in Iran,” likely the IRGC, had settled upon an assassination of Jubeir. Arbabsiar Even Okayed Civilian Casualties The informant agreed the cartel was willing to execute the hit at a price of $1.5 million. Within days, Arbabsiar and the informant came to an agreement, and the cartel began planning the assassination. This included gathering intelligence. The informant told Arbabsiar he already had a cartel member doing surveillance in Washington, D.C., identifying the Saudi ambassador and determining a time, place, and parameters for attack. Jubeir frequently dined at Café Milano, an upscale Italian restaurant in the Georgetown neighborhood, so it was decided this was the ideal location for targeting the ambassador. All this time, the informant had been recording Arbabsiar. In one of the mid-July conversations, the Iranian agent seemed fully aware of the high risk of American casualties, at one point suggesting the cartel take care not to kill innocents. But by the end of the discussion, Arbabsiar made clear the assassination needed to happen at any cost. “They want [the ambassador] done, if the hundred go with him, [expletive] ’em,” was Arbabsiar’s disturbing and shocking proclamation on the recording. He and the informant next discussed the means by which to kill the ambassador, with Arbabsiar deferring to the cartel’s judgment. Again, he suggested limiting collateral damage, only to emphasize again the need for the ambassador to be killed regardless. If the cartel was unable to kill Jubeir in isolation outside the restaurant, Arbabsiar was perfectly fine with bombing the establishment while he was dining. The informant then advised his client the restaurant has anywhere from 100 to 150 people inside at a given time, is surrounded by buildings, and even U.S. senators who frequent the establishment could become casualties. Once more, Arbabsiar dismissed the concerns, describing it as “no big deal.” The Plan Was Foiled In August, a total of $100,000 was wired to the cartel as a down payment for carrying out the operation. It isn’t clear when the assassination would have taken place, but conversations between Arbabsiar, the informant, and the leadership back in Iran (primarily Quds Force operative Shakuri) indicate it would have occurred in October. On Sept. 28, Arbabsiar boarded a plane at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport for a flight to Mexico, intending to serve himself to the cartel as collateral until the assassination was executed. When he landed in Mexico, the trap was sprung. Denied entry by Mexican authorities, Arbabsiar was forced to fly back to NYC, where he was then arrested on September 29. In short order, he confessed to investigators his role in the plot. He cooperated with the FBI as they attempted to build a case against Shakuri, who was, until Holder and Mueller’s Oct. 11 announcement, unaware Arbabsiar had been caught. Tragedy had been averted, and the arrest and eventual conviction of Arbabsiar was one of the lesser-known victories in the War on Terror. Still, the incident is highly unsettling. Although the affidavit doesn’t identify the cartel (referring to it only as “Drug Cartel #1”), it does describe it as: [A] large, sophisticated, and violent drug-trafficking cartel. It is well-known throughout North America, and its principal places of operation are Mexico and the United States. … Drug Cartel #1 has access to military-grade weaponry and explosives, and has engaged in numerous acts of violence, including assassinations and murders. Based on the description, this cartel is probably a “household name,” easily recognized by authorities and the public if revealed. This same cartel is likely still active inside the United States and a belligerent in the Mexican drug war. Clearly, Iran felt confident it could, for the right price, trust Mexican drug cartels to do Tehran’s dirty work. With such able and willing enemies just over the border, the threats of groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS seem distant by comparison. This ‘Act of War’ Would Have Changed Obama’s Presidency Former Defense Secretary James Mattis hammered home the gravity of this “act of war.” Mattis, who was the commander of Central Command (CENTCOM) at the time, spoke of the event in great detail in his memoir, published earlier this year. “It would have changed history,” he said, noting he’d also seen incriminating intelligence of Tehran’s direct involvement. “Had the bomb gone off, those in the restaurant and on the street would have been ripped apart, blood rushing down sewer drains,” Mattis gruesomely described the consequences of the attack had it been successful. It would’ve also changed the course of the Obama presidency. The 44th president made a grand bargain with Iran a central focus of his foreign policy. Had the assassination succeeded, the Iran nuclear deal would’ve been off the table. Even members of his own Cabinet would have advised against negotiating with a regime responsible for such an overt act of hostility. It would have also jeopardized Obama’s prospects of reelection. Opposition candidates would have used the incident as proof his critics were right all along: Obama was weak on national security and Iran. Of course, that also would have depended on how Obama responded to the attack. George W. Bush won reelection in 2004 in large part due to his response to the 9/11 attacks. It would’ve been politically disastrous for Obama not to retaliate in overt, resolute fashion. But what should he have done? Mattis argued Obama should have drummed up public support for a tougher line against Iran, evoking Woodrow Wilson and the 1917 Zimmermann Telegram, laying the groundwork for military action. Having held an adversarial stance toward Iran his entire career (and possibly relieved of command for it), Mattis clearly considers October 2011 a missed opportunity to resoundingly punish the ayatollah and his cronies for their crimes. We Can No Longer Ignore Mexican Drug Cartels A retaliation never happened, of course, because the assassination wasn’t successful. Had it been, the White House may have had no choice but to pay greater heed to Mattis’ suggestions. 2011 was a year of escalating tensions with Iran over its nuclear program. A few months after the assassination was foiled, a military build-up, including British and French forces, took place in the Gulf. Thus, if Washington and its allies sought to take action against Tehran, the military presence was available to make it happen. Israel, which at the time was threatening preemptive military action against Iran over its nuclear program, could’ve leveraged the incident to push Washington to strike on its behalf. Given the level of hostilities brewing at the time, a successful killing of Jubeir seems like the spark that could have lit the proverbial powder keg. Eight years later, the Mexican drug cartel threat seems to sow division rather than collective urgency. Policymakers remain entranced by the Middle East, while the media offered scant coverage of the deaths of nine American-Mexican dual citizens. In the past, both groups have focused on frivolous matters, such as President Donald Trump’s rhetoric toward cartel-associated groups such as MS-13. Nor does the problem elicit significant concern among the Democratic presidential candidates. But the day will come when the threat can no longer be ignored. In the meantime, those dismissive of the danger posed by the Mexican drug cartels ought to learn of the time they nearly carried out the worst terrorist attack in America since 9/11 and almost triggered a resulting war with Iran. A lone informant within a cartel averting catastrophe serves as very cold comfort, indeed.

#### US-Iran war causes extinction

DIAVOLO 20 --- LUCY DIAVOLO, News and politics editor for Teen Vogue, “Donald Trump’s Order to Kill Iranian Leader Qasem Soleimani Feels Like World War 3, but We Must Say No to War With Iran”, Teen Vogue, Jan 8th 2020, <https://www.teenvogue.com/story/donald-trumps-kill-qasem-soleimani-world-war-3-no-to-war-with-iran> (BJN)

The Pentagon announced late Thursday night that the U.S. military killed a top-ranking senior Iranian official in an airstrike carried out at the direction of President Donald Trump. The killing is understood as a major escalation in U.S.-Iran relations, prompting online conversations about the prospect of an impending “World War 3.” Last night, as I watched our latest existential terror unfold through a torrent of World War 3 memes, I found myself wondering not just what political leaders will do but also what the people of both countries and the broader world will experience as we prepare for what now feels like inevitable further escalations. While the potential for large-scale global political conflict is palpable, the more immediate concern will be the drumbeat for marching forward with military action that could take us there. How to make sense of it, this immediate future that now rides on an ever-thinner razor’s edge? First, we have to establish how we got here. Last night, the Pentagon put out a statement saying that the U.S. military had killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani “at the direction of the president” with the aim of “deterring future Iranian attack plans.” The Pentagon statement claimed that Soleimani, leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, was responsible for hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries to U.S. and coalition service members. Trump’s history with Iran isn’t particularly friendly. Trump called Iran a “rogue state whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed and chaos" in a 2017 United Nations speech. In 2018, he pulled the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal (aka the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) negotiated by his predecessor, President Barack Obama. That same year, he threatened the Iranian president on Twitter. As laid out on a timeline by Al Jazeera, Iran refused to meet demands the Trump administration made after ending the JCPOA. In response, Trump launched two new rounds of sanctions in 2018, adding to a lineage of U.S. sanctions against the country dating back to Ronald Reagan’s administration. In 2019, Trump increased sanctions against Iran and designated the IRGC a terrorist force. Recently, Trump beefed up U.S. military presence in the Middle East following riots and attacks on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, Iraq — one of Iran’s two neighbors that has been the theatre for a protracted U.S.-led war and one that’s been deeply enmeshed in the history of U.S.-Iranian relations since Iran’s 1979 revolution. The embassy riots reportedly came in response to U.S. strikes on facilities tied to an Iranian-backed militia, which was itself a response to a rocket attack that killed a U.S. contractor. So how does Soleimani fit into all this? As reported by the Washington Post, Soleimani was the leader of a group known as the Quds Force, part of the IRGC, which is a major branch of Iran’s military that arose after the 1979 Islamic revolution. The Quds Force has a reputation for being the IRGC’s elite and efficient soldiers. In his role, according to Al Jazeera, Soleimani helmed Iranian operations in foreign countries like Iraq, where he was involved in the fight against the Islamic State (aka ISIS), and Syria, where he supported President Bashar al-Assad. According to the Associated Press, he was also allied with several militia groups in countries across the Middle East. If it seems like Soleimani was a big deal, it’s because he very much was. Considered by some the second most powerful man in the country, Soleimani’s execution at Trump’s directive is the exact sort of geopolitical conflict that could reignite long-standing tensions in extremely unpredictable ways. Some time after Trump tweeted out a low-resolution picture of a U.S. flag, Iranian ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed “harsh vengeance,” and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani promised “revenge.” Nobody seems to know what to make of all this. As journalists rushed out quick bios of Soleimani, a visual guide to the U.S. airstrike that killed him, and ceaseless live updates on the story, Twitter cycled through trending topics trying to make some light of the dark situation. Beyond the World War 3 memes, some people pointed out that Trump’s frequent tweets about Obama starting a war with Iran to win an election seemed relevant. Many others discovered that receiving college financial aid through FAFSA requires registering for selective service. Others jokingly considered another Area 51 raid for some extraterrestrial salvation. Unfortunately, as climate justice activists are wont to remind us, there is no planet B. The questions about what happens next are anxiety-inducing, especially for people in Iran and the surrounding region. United Nations population figures estimate that roughly 80 million people live in Iran. Estimates for Iraq are near 40 million and, for Afghanistan, around 35 million. Iran also has historical tensions with other regional powers, like Saudi Arabia and Israel (two of the United States’ biggest allies in the region) and is currently aligned with global powers China and Russia (representing two of the United States’ more contentious political relationships). If a U.S. invasion of Iran was as deadly and prolonged as those in Iraq or Afghanistan, hundreds of thousands could die, many of them civilians. If this conflict somehow became as deadly as World War I or World War II, it could mean countless more killed, injured, or displaced from their homes. Simply put, the question of war with Iran must be answered with a loud and emphatic no, as planned protest actions for Saturday, January 4, already intend to communicate. Whatever legal framework the president and his supporters might cling to in order to justify Trump’s right to direct the attack, the reality is that this assassination is an act of war — whether the White House wants to officially designate it as one or not. Some are cheering Soleimani’s killing, publishing extremely reductive takes about the removal of the “world’s No. 1 bad guy.” But Trump’s directive has unknown potential to irrevocably destabilize an entire region and put millions at risk. And that is very, very scary.

#### Failure to monitor space debris effectively triggers miscalculated war.

Peter Dockrill 16. Award-winning science & technology journalist. “Space Junk Accidents Could Trigger Armed Conflict, Study Finds.” <https://www.sciencealert.com/space-junk-accidents-could-trigger-armed-conflict-expert-warns>.

The increasingly crowded space in Earth's low orbit could set the stage for an international armed conflict, says a new study. Researchers from the Russian Academy of Sciences warn that accidents stemming from the steady rise in space junk floating around the planet could incite political rows and even warfare, with nations potentially mistaking debris-caused incidents as the results of intentional aggressive acts by others. In a paper published in Acta Astronautica, the team suggests that space debris in the form of spent rocket parts and other fragments of hardware hurtling at high speed pose a "special political danger" that could dangerously escalate tensions between nations. According to the study, destructive impacts caused by random space junk cannot easily be told apart from military attacks. "The owner of the impacted and destroyed satellite can hardly quickly determine the real cause of the accident," the authors write. The risks of such an event occurring are compounded by the sheer volume of debris now orbiting Earth. Recent figures from NASA indicate that there are more than 500,000 pieces of space junk currently being tracked in orbit, travelling at speeds up to 28,160 km/h (17,500 mph). The majority of those objects are small – around the size of a marble – but some 20,000 of them are bigger than a softball. In addition to these 500,000 or so fragments – which are big enough for scientists to know about them – NASA estimates that there are millions of undetectable pieces of debris in orbit that are too small to be monitored. But even extremely small fragments such as these pose a threat – in fact, they're considered a greater risk than trackable debris, as their invisible status means spacecraft and satellites can't do anything to avoid them until it's too late. As NASA observed in 2013: "Even tiny paint flecks can damage a spacecraft when travelling at these velocities. In fact a number of space shuttle windows have been replaced because of damage caused by material that was analysed and shown to be paint flecks… With so much orbital debris, there have been surprisingly few disastrous collisions." While we may have been lucky in the past, we can't rely on that to continue. The study by the Russian team cites the repeated sudden failures of defence satellites in past decades that were never explained. The researchers attribute two possible causes: either unrecorded collisions with space junk, or aggressive actions from adversaries. "This is a politically dangerous dilemma," the authors write.

### Plan---1AC

#### The United States Federal Government should reduce its alliance commitments with Canada by declaring that it won’t support Canada under article 5 until Canada meets NATO article 3 obligations.

### Solvency---1AC

#### **Conditioning article 5 on article 3 obligations is key to forcing Canada into US BMD cooperation**

Lam 17 [Danny Lam is a foreign policy writer that focuses on Canadian missile defense for Real Clear Defense and other defense think tanks, “Canada Violates NATO Agreement”, 2-16-2017, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/02/17/canada\_violates\_nato\_agreement\_110822.html] IanM

Canadians have long enjoyed the security and comfort of belonging to NATO: a robust military alliance that won the cold war. Today, Canada, a founding member of NATO, is in default ofour **treaty obligations** under Article 3 of the NATO treaty.

**Article 3** of the NATO treaty **states**:

“In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and **collective** capacity to resist **armed attack**.”

**Failure to meet** its **obligations** under Article 3 calls into question any (or all) obligations that **NATO members** have to Canada **under the "collective defence**" principle of [Article 5](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm). This issue is coming to a head with the emergence of North Korea as a belligerent, unstable, and nuclear-armed regime.

**North Korea’s** **latest test** of a solid-fueled cold-launched Pukguksong-2 ballistic missile **demonstrates how far** and **how fast** the **regime has progressed** from testing a nuclear device to fielding a credible nuclear arsenal.

While the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea](http://www.korea-dpr.com/) (DPRK, North Korea) has not demonstrated conclusively the capability of their Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) to deliver a nuclear warhead to the continental USA, this latest development adds a new twist to the problem. Pukguksong-2 is a [solid-fueled missile](http://www.aerospace.org/education/stem-outreach/space-primer/solid-propellants/) mounted on a tracked transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), and is capable of being rapidly launched from anywhere in North Korea. But there is more.

**North Korea purchased** twelve **Foxtrot** and **Golf**(Project 641 & 628) **submarines** from Russia as “scrap” in the 1990s. It is plausible that parts and subsystems cannibalized from these vessels are being used to build a North Korean ballistic missile submarine. When North Korea establishes a capability to launch ballistic missiles from a submarine, which they have been [working on](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/world/asia/north-korea-submarine-missile.html), it greatly complicates allied abilities to **detect** and **counter missile launches**.

[Experts in the United States](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/north-koreas-missile-threats-to-the-u-s-may-not-be-empty-for-long/) believe that **North Korea’s ICBMs** are either **already**[**capable of reaching**](http://38north.org/2015/12/icbm122115/) CONUS (contiguous **U**nited **S**tates) with a nuclear warhead or **will be able to** reliably do so within as little as 5 years. Within this timeframe, a submarine launched ballistic missile with sufficient range to reach CONUS is [achievable](http://38north.org/2016/08/slbm082616/).

The severity of this threat is exposed by U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis when he publicly warned North Korea (3 Feb 2017) of America's “effective and overwhelming” response to the use of nuclear weapons.

Contrast this with the Liberal regime of **Canada,** which has seemingly **not taken** the North Korean nuclear **ballistic missile threat seriously**. Anti-missile capability is not been publicly specified for the Canadian replacement fighter, the “One Class” [surface combatants](http://defence.frontline.online/blogs/3896-Dr.-Danny-Lam/5458-Will-CSC-need-anti-ballistic-missile-capability%3F), nor is the [existing NORAD system](http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=8406082&Language=E) tasked for ballistic missile defense.

Candid comments **about** the North Korean nuclear threat by President Trump and Secretary Mattis to Canadians officials during the Trudeau-Trump visit failed to result in any noticeable change in Canada's defense policy. Notably, there has been no visible effort to update the Statement of Requirements (SOR) **for major defense procurements** after being clearly and **publicly warned by the U.S. and allies** about the North Korean threat.

On 15 Feb, Secretary **Mattis**further **warned** NATO allies that American support has limits, and he repeated the call for allies to spend more on their militaries. Based on its own record, one can assume that the Trump administration will expect decisive, significant change to be swiftly initiated.

Canada's oft-cited tendency to hope the U.S. will defend Canada if necessary, is clearly not a sentiment shared by big brother. Vice President Pence and Secretary Mattis [reiterated at the NATO meeting in Brussels](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/world/europe/jim-mattis-nato-trump.html?_r=0) that the Trump Administration cannot be indifferent and sit idly by while allies free-ride, like Canada is doing on the US ballistic missile defense program.

In 2005, Canada chose [not to participate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Missile_Defence_in_Canada) in the U.S. Missile Defense program and has **shown no inclination** to change this decision. Thus, Canada does not contribute to the present [limited defense](https://www.mda.mil/system/system.html) against ballistic missiles that involve an extensive, layered system of sensors, sea and shore based interceptors from Japan to Alaska to CONUS.

While Canada does have modest anti-submarine resources on the west coast, it is nowhere near sufficient to credibly patrol the large expanse of ocean from which a North Korean submarine can launch nuclear ballistic missiles once they slip past the choke points guarded by allies.

This raises questions as to what obligations allies like South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. will **uphold to defend** Canada, either by intercepting ballistic missiles aimed at Canadian targets early on, or by preventing NORK (North Korea) ballistic missile submarines from breaking out.

By not participating in the Ballistic Missile Defense program in the face of a clear, indisputable, obvious threat from North Korea, Canada is in effect, presuming that allies will defend Canada despite it not following the 2% GDP target for defence spending that NATO allies agreed upon in 2006.

In fact, in early 2016, NATO pointed out that Canada is among the [bottom 1/3 of allies](http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/canada-among-bottom-third-of-allies-in-defence-spending-nato-says) when it comes to defence spending.

Canadians are naïve as to how little capability there is for ballistic missile defense in South Korea (which is acquiring its first THAAD battery this year) and Japan. Their capabilities must be reserved for the much more numerous threats from NORK short and medium range missiles and potentially, a Chinese [nuclear first strike](http://www.sldinfo.com/deciphering-prcs-stance-on-thaad-in-south-korea-a-chinese-first-strike-policy-in-asia/). Defence of North America will not be a priority even if they are willing.

**What about the U.S.?** **There is** only a handful (fewer than 30) of [land based Anti-Ballistic Missiles](https://www.mda.mil/system/gmd.html) (ABMs) **in Alaska**. That doesn’t go far with a 'probability of kill' of 0.5 requiring two interceptors per target if the attack uses multiple missiles with decoys.

Finally, that leaves sea-based ABMs launched from U.S. Aegis destroyers or cruisers, since Canada has none. This option is possible only if the vessels are in the right place at the right time and have sufficient missiles available. But with the potential for ballistic missile submarines prowling about, anti-submarine resources (both surface and air) will be stretched thin.

**Canada**, **by not having Aegis-capable vessels equipped for missile defense**, nor having significant anti-submarine assets, **is** in effect **counting on the U.S**. to stretch its own anti-missile resources to include Canada. Why?

What obligates the U.S. to do so when Canada is clearly in violation of our treaty obligation to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” (Article 3)?

Canadians, and the Trudeau regime, need to recognize that Canada is in breach of her NATO treaty obligations, and as such, can expect no aid from allies under Article 5 **until** such a time as when Canada meets its obligations under Article 3.

#### Getting Canada on board revitalizes BMD---enhances strategy and upgrades capabilities---BUT plan is key---it gives them *political cover*---otherwise it won’t happen

Dowd 16 [Alan Dowd is a Senior Fellow for the Fraser Institute, “Time for Canada to join missile defense team”, 7-11-2016, https://www.legion.org/landingzone/233302/time-canada-join-missile-defense-team] IanM

Reports that Ottawa and Washington have resumed their delicate missile-defense discussions suggest that **Canada** may be ready to join the global **m**issile-**d**efense coalition. If so, it would be a welcome development.

The operative word here is 'global.' The missile shield now taking shape is a truly international missile defense (IMD) enfolding some of Canada's closest allies and oldest friends.

Let's start in Europe. In 2010, **alliance leaders** **declared missile defense** "a core element of our collective defense" and pledged to "develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack." Toward that end, Britain and Denmark have allowed modifications to early-warning radars to augment the missile shield. Spain is hosting a rotation of four Aegis missile-defense warships. Germany hosts a missile-defense operations center. Romania will host a land-based variant of the Aegis system, dubbed 'Aegis Ashore,' starting in 2015, as will Poland by 2018. Turkey hosts a powerful X-Band missile-defense radar, allowing the alliance to scan the horizon for threats from Iran.

Beyond NATO, U.S.-Israeli cooperation dating back to 1986 has yielded a sophisticated, layered defense against missiles, including the Iron Dome system, David's Sling system and Arrow anti-missile system. Israel also hosts an X-Band radar.

Likewise, Qatar hosts an X-Band radar. And the UAE recently became the first foreign government to purchase the U.S. terminal high altitude air defense system (THAAD).

Australia was an early adopter, signing a 25-year pact on missile-defense cooperation with the United States in 2004.

With a wary eye on North Korea, Japan deploys six Aegis ships, hosts an X-Band radar, with another on the way, and is co-developing a new interceptor missile for Aegis ships.

The United States has invested $157.8 billion on missile defense since 1985 an average of $5.6 billion per year. The dividend: thirty ground-based interceptors in California and Alaska, with 14 more on the way; two active THAAD batteries, with more scheduled to come online in 2013; 26 Aegis warships, building toward 36 by 2018.

Thanks to America's missile-defense investments, NATO has been able 'plug into' the existing missile-defense architecture for a relatively small amount, as NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has explained, enabling the system "to defend European populations and territory from missile attack."

All told, 21 nations are directly participating in this networked system of systems. Yet Canada is not one of them. Given Canada's historic willingness to contribute to allied efforts from Normandy's beaches to NATO's founding, from the defense of Korea to the liberation of Kuwait, from Afghanistan to Libya it's jarring to scan the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) growing list of international partners and not see Canada's name.

To be sure, **support for missile defense**, while widespread, is not universal. Russia is a vocal critic of NATO's missile defenses. Among 'the main external military dangers' identified by the Russian government are 'the creation and deployment of strategic missile-defense systems.' However, Moscow's opposition seems to have more to do with its inability to hold sway over Eastern Europe than with any real threat to Russian security. As then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained in 2010, "The Russians know that our missile defenses are designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic missiles launched by a country such as Iran or North Korea."

Testing Times
That brings us to the driving force behind the growing acceptance of missile defense: the burgeoning missile threat.

"If North Korea would be ready to attack the United States," Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper conceded in 2006, "that would be a risk for Canada's national security as well not only because of our common values, but because of our geographical proximity."

**Given North Korea's** technological advances and political unpredictability, that scenario seems more likely now than it was then, which may help explain reports of fresh missile-defense discussions between Washington and Ottawa.

Since 2009, North Korea has detonated two nuclear weapons, conducted long-range missile tests under the guise of satellite launches, threatened nuclear strikes against the United States, and demonstrated a threshold ICBM capability by lofting a satellite into orbit. Moreover, the Defense Intelligence Agency concludes "with moderate confidence" that North Korea "currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles."

Likewise, the British government reported in 2011 that Iran has "been carrying out covert ballistic missile tests and rocket launches, including testing missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload." Iran has tested a ballistic missile that brings targets in Europe within range. And the Pentagon reported in 2012 that "Iran may be technically capable of flight-testing an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015."

The drive for long-range missilery by Tehran and Pyongyang is part of a larger missile-proliferation trend: Three decades ago, there were nine countries that fielded ballistic missiles. Today, there are 31.

The good news amidst this worrisome trend is that missile defense is no longer simply a theoretical possibility. In testing, missile defense has scored successes on 59 of 74 attempts 79.7 percent of the time. During a 2012 exercise, the system deflected four out of five "near-simultaneous representative threats," as MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring reported last month. And in battle, missile-defense systems have protected population centers in Israel and military facilities in Kuwait.

**If Canada** decides to **join** the missile-defense team, Ottawa could contribute its voice to **missile-defense decisions**. Having a voice makes a difference, as Canada knows from participation in NATO. **Canada**’s voice **helped guide** a unified Germany into **NATO** after the Cold War, enhanced alliance deployments in Afghanistan and steered alliance operations over Libya.

Beyond wise counsel, **Canada** could join the Aegis missile-defense fleet, thus serving as an IMD force multiplier. Yet another way Canada could contribute is by **dedicating facilities** to the IMD effort, as Britain, Israel, Japan, Turkey and other allies have. In fact, Ottawa contemplated hosting an X-Band radar in northeastern Canada during an earlier round of missile-defense discussions.

"**Canada**", as former Canadian diplomat Paul Chapin has observed, "seems **able to support** missile defense for others, just not for itself." That may change in the months ahead. If nothing else, the enthusiastic **embrace** of missile defense in Europe and beyond should serve as political cover for Ottawa. Instead of sitting on the sidelines, **Canadian policymakers** can **tell** their ambivalent **constituencies**, "NATO made us do it."

#### The US has *already* declared we won’t defend Canada, which thumps the DA’s---BUT article 5 makes Canada think US will defend *regardless*---only removing that provides a shock that gets them on board with BMD

Shinkman 17 [Paul Shinkman is a national security correspondent. He joined U.S. News & World Report in 2012 and has reported multiple times from conflict zones in Ukraine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where he embedded with local and American forces, “Mattis Says ‘We Stand By’ Canada Amid Concern About Missile Defense Policy”, 9-19-2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-09-19/mattis-says-we-stand-by-canada-despite-new-doubts-from-northerly-neighbor] IanM

DEFENSE SECRETARY [Jim Mattis](https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-01-13/10-things-you-didnt-know-about-james-mattis) sought to reassure jittery Canadians after a **general** in charge of North American missile defense **made** the stunning pronouncement to Parliament in Ottawa last week that the **U.S. would** not **be obligated** **to defend** its **neighbor to the north** in the event of a missile attack from North Korea.

"This is a relationship that has been many decades in the making," Mattis said when asked about the remark, which has received widespread coverage in Canada. "It doesn't start with us. It will not end with us."

The story broke last week, after the Canadian general who serves as the No. 2 at the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, appeared before the House of Commons on Thursday and repeated a particular aspect of cross-border cooperation that is known to experts but rarely uttered in public. It comes at a time of heightened conflict between the United States and North Korea, when the threat posed by Pyongyang has made the likelihood of an intercontinental ballistic missile strike more likely than any time since the end of the Cold War.

"The extent of the U.S. policy is not to defend Canada," Lt. Gen. Pierre St-Amand [told his Parliament](http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/north-korea-commons-1.4289866) about a potential missile attack from North Korea. "That's the fact I can bring to the table."

The statement was accurate. The U.S. is not beholden to try to shoot down a missile aimed at – or accidentally straying toward – its northerly NATO ally. But the fact that a top officer at the Colorado-based headquarters overseeing North American missile defense **would highlight this division** offered a potentially troubling appraisal from one of America's closest allies.

"It's a big deal," says Jeremy Littlewood, a professor at Carleton University in Ottawa and an expert on weapons of mass destruction. "To come out openly in Parliament and say, 'This is my understanding,' it does lay bare the nuances and gray zones that are in the policy."

Mattis had not previously heard St-Amand's comments when asked during [a trip to Mexico City](https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-09-15/mattis-military-ties-with-mexico-remain-strong-despite-tension) on Saturday and seemed surprised by them.

The former Marine general pointed to the two countries' history of military cooperation dating back to World War II, including Canadian forces' cooperation with American troops during the D-Day invasion and the Korean War. Mattis mentioned that the No. 2 officer at NORAD is always a Canadian, and he specifically referenced the Princess Patricia Light Infantry, based in Edmonton, Alberta, which in 2001 reinforced the unit he commanded in Afghanistan.

"They were there when we got attacked. We stand by them. We share the North American Air Defense Command," Mattis said. "We are even embedded in joint coalition commands like that."

Other **defense officials** speaking privately point to the Article 5 "[**collective defense**](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm)" section of the NATO Treaty, **through which allies** consider an attack on one as an attack on all. The U.S. is the only NATO country to invoke that part of the treaty, following the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. The language of the treaty, however, does not necessarily guarantee military support for an ally.

And Mattis' verbal support for America's northern neighbor does not undo Ottawa's decision in 2005 under its Liberal government not to enter into official partnership with the America's principal missile shield, known as the Ballistic Missile Defense System.

When asked for further comment, a Defense Department spokesman said, "the NORAD deputy commander's comments will speak for themselves."

"The Ground-based Midcourse Defense element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System is deployed to protect and defend the United States," U.S. Army Lt. Col. Jamie Davis says. "Canada is not a partner in the GMD program."

**Joining** the U.S. missile shield **has been** an **area of controversy** for Canadian politicians for decades. Opponents cite the expense of defending against enemy missiles, which according to the Government Accountability Office has cost the U.S. [$123 billion](https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-381) as of May. **Leaders** in Ottawa also **believe** Canada is **less likely** than the U.S. **to be targeted** by an country with ICBMs, in part due to its limited involvement in overseas conflicts.

**There is**, however, a sense in Canada that the U.S. would protect them nonetheless, either as a **matter of principle** or because it **wouldn't be able to** **determine** quickly enough on what side of the U.S-Canada border an incoming warhead would land.

"Even if there's a missile strike," Littlewood says, "and it hits Canada and doesn't hit the U.S., I think it's inconceivable for many of us **to think** the **U.S. would turn to Canada** and say, 'You know what ~~guys~~ [**yall]**? You're on your own because you didn't join missile defense.'"

"Canada and the **U.S**. are **going to come** to each other's aid **in the event of an incident or attack**," he says.

#### Plan’s key---Canada *won’t do a thing* even if the US makes a great case for BMD UNLESS we threaten to no longer defend---that puts the *ball in Canada’s court* and flips key holdouts

Harvey 14 [Frank Harvey was appointed Eric Dennis Memorial Chair of Government and Politics in 2013 (Dalhousie University), and held the position of University Research Professor of International Relations from 2008-2013. He served as Associate Dean of Research in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (2011-2013), held the 2007 J. William Fulbright Visiting Research Chair in Canadian Studies, served as Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, and is currently a Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence”, March 2014, https://www.cgai.ca/canada\_ballistic\_missile\_defence#About%20the%20Authors] IanM

Why would any Canadian government support BMD to protect European, American and Asian allies, territories and populations yet **continue to shy away** from embracing the utility of bilateral negotiations with the US to protect Canada? This serious (and potentially dangerous) inconsistency demands some logical explanation.

Perhaps **Canadian officials** are **perfectly secure** in the belief (hope) that US officials will fulfill their obligation **to protect** their closest NATO ally from any and all incoming missiles. So why rock the boat - we’re quietly participating in BMD without having to engage in another public debate on the subject.

But **what if there are no** clearly articulated **US guarantees** **to protect** all Canadian territory and populations from ballistic missiles? If these security guarantees exist only in the minds of Canadian officials, then the **absence** **of** any and all **discussions** with Washington **on** North American **BMD** constitutes a serious error in judgement. It also **represents** a very **risky abrogation** of the government’s **core obligation** to proactively protect Canadians from “grave” ballistic missile threats the government (and our allies) have already acknowledged are real and getting worse.

Ottawa should engage in high-level consultations with Washington on BMD architecture, precisely because the government has already embraced the strategic imperatives tied to BMD. Drawing imaginary distinctions between American, European and Asia security on the one hand, and Canadian security on the other, makes no sense.

The **onus** is no longer on BMD proponents to make the case for Canada-US cooperation on BMD. **The onus** now **is on** the few remaining holdouts in the Canadian government **to explain why** **Canadians do not deserve** the same **security guarantees** and protections everyone else is getting.

#### Canadian BMD strengthens US Canadian relations and bolsters Article 5 credibility---BUT plan is key---domestic backlash means inducements fail

Pugliese 5 [David Pugliese is a Space News Correspondent, “Canadian Government Pulls Out Of Missile Defense Effort”, 3-1-2005, https://spacenews.com/canadian-government-pulls-out-missile-defense-effort/] IanM

VICTORIA, British Columbia – In a stunning reversal of policy, Canada announced it has decided not to join the U.S. missile defense system, a move that analysts and industry officials say could harm relations between the two countries.

Prime Minister Paul Martin said Feb. 24 that Canada will instead focus its contribution to North American defense by improving intelligence-gathering, coastal surveillance and continued participation in the joint U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command.

“Let me be clear, we respect the right of the United States to defend itself and its people,” Martin said in a televised statement from Ottawa. “However, [Ballistic Missile Defense] is not where we will concentrate our efforts. Instead, we will act both alone and with our neighbors on defense priorities outlined in yesterday’s budget.”

That budget boosts the Canadian Forces’ funding and troop strength over the next five years.

Martin said Canada informed the United States of its decision several days ago and he expects to discuss the issue with U.S. President George W. Bush.

“Canada recognizes the enormous burden on the United States’ shoulders when it comes to peace and security,” Martin said . “By increasing funding to the military, Canada intends to share in this responsibility.”

The announcement is a major about-face for the Martin government, which last January started negotiations with the United States to take part in the missile defense system. Martin was a supporter of Canadian involvement in the shield, saying it would contribute to Canadian security and sovereignty.

But growing opposition in Martin’s own political party and among the Canadian public made it difficult for the government to sign on to the program, said military analyst Steve Staples of the Ottawa-based Polaris Institute. Recent public opinion polls show that only around 40 percent of Canadians support taking part in the shield.

In January 2004, Canada requested access to technical data on the missile defense system so it could decide whether to play a role. The wording of a letter from then-Defence Minister David Pratt to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld all but stated that Canada would take part.

“It is our intent to negotiate in the coming months a Missile Defence Framework Memorandum of Understanding with the United States with the objective of including Canada as a participant in the current U.S. missile defense program and expanding and enhancing information exchange,” Pratt wrote.

Military analyst Jim Ferguson said the reversal will **not go over well** in the United States and will raise further questions about Canada’s commitment to the defense of North America.

“You have to think from the American perspective that they must be scratching their heads and wondering what we are doing up here,” said Ferguson, director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg.

Indeed, Paul Cellucci, U.S. Ambassador to Canada, said the Bush administration does not understand Canada’s decision not to become involved in the shield.

“We don’t get it,” Cellucci said in Toronto in a Feb. 23 interview with the Canadian Press news service. “If there’s a missile incoming, and it’s heading toward Canada, you are going to leave it up to the United States to determine what to do about that missile. We don’t think that is in Canada’s sovereign interest.”

In a Jan. 10 interview with the Canadian Press , Cellucci said he expected the Martin government would decide to take part in the missile shield. He said at that time he has been told by Canadian officials to expect a decision by the end of March.

Norbert Cyr, vice-president of communications for the Canadian Defence Industries Association, said the Canadian government’s decision likely means almost an end to any Canadian industry involvement in missile defense contracts.

“We are very disappointed,” Cyr said from Saint Jean-sur-Richeleau, Quebec. “We had hoped that a Canadian decision to participate would help improve Canada-U.S. relations and this development certainly isn’t going to help.”

Relations have been strained over the last several years between the two countries because of Canada’s decision not to take part in the Iraq war.

Canada’s Department of National Defence had produced a report in March 2003 determining that Canadian companies could win between $100 million to $180 million a year in contracts for missile defense.

“Time pressure is great for potential Canadian participation — [we] ‘need to get on board’ or be locked out for this decade,” officials said in the 71-page report, titled “Potential Canadian Industrial Participation in the U.S Ballistic Missile Defense System Program.”

Martin’s ruling Liberal Party government had come under criticism in the House of Commons for entering into the missile defense discussions with the United States in the first place. Opposition Members of Parliament from the Bloc Quebecois and the New Democratic Party have repeatedly warned that the system is the first step in a U.S. plan to put weapons into orbit.

Martin also expected to face widespread resistance to the missile defense system at a Liberal Party policy convention scheduled for March 5. Delegates to that convention were scheduled to vote on several policy amendments calling for the government to withdraw from negotiations with the United States over the system. Staples said it was highly likely that those amendments would have been supported, putting more political pressure on Martin to withdraw from the negotiations.

The speculation over Canada’s stance on the missile shield also prompted raucous debate in the Commons. On Feb. 23, Deputy Conservative leader Peter MacKay quoted Martin’s previous statements supporting the U.S. system and accused the prime minister of flip-flopping on the issue.

With the decision made a day later, Conservative member of parliament Kevin Sorenson questioned why the government did not follow through with its pledge to allow the House of Commons to debate the matter before the government made its announcement. He also questioned why Martin had previously supported missile defense, only to turn his back on the program now.

In fact, last February then-Defence Minister David Pratt said the Canadian government was considering making available sites in the country’s Arctic for use as missile defense radars.

A Department of National Defence report noted that the U.S. missile system could benefit from the **use of Canadian territory**. That could involve **placing tracking** and **target control sensors** on Canada’s east coast, according to the seven-page May 7, 2001, report, “Potential Canadian Involvement in Ballistic Missile Defence.” The report was declassified under Canada’s Access to Information law.

“To properly address the middle-eastern threat an east-coast system would have to be deployed,” stated the report prepared by the Defence Department’s space directorate. “Canada’s value-added role would be to provide a place to deploy such a system … Canadian locations could provide TTC [track and target control] of the target missile 2-3 minutes faster than mainland U.S. locations.”

In an October interview, Canadian Defence Minister Bill Graham acknowledged there is widespread opposition in Canada to the U.S. missile shield. But Graham, a strong supporter of missile defense, said it was important for Canada to take part since it sent a positive message that the country was taking a role in defending the continent.